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Zsolt Bayer: Welcome to our viewers – this is Ambrózy, Bayer, and Pikk. To be honest I don’t like French-suited card games, but I’m a big fan of [the Hungarian card game] Ulti, which is played with three people, and so we’ve invited the Prime Minister. Hello, Prime Minister.
The best choice. Hello.
Zsolt Bayer: Let’s face it, Ulti is something serious!
It’s one of the basic skills of the profession. People make fun of me or mock me when I say that someone who can’t play Ulti can’t be Prime Minister. But this is a deadly serious statement, given that no other politics in Europe is like Hungarian politics – because of history, among many other reasons; and there’s no game like Ulti, because everywhere else they play with an even number of players. Playing with an odd number of people is a Hungarian thing. So if I want to achieve something, two people will join forces against me and I have to beat them. Or, if you can’t do something good, you have to immediately ruin the game of the one who can. This is also the essence of Hungarian politics.
Zsolt Bayer: Right! That brings me to my first question. Let’s get straight into domestic politics. Your challenger is now a man who, if he weren’t your challenger, would be targeted by the left-wing and liberal press all day long as a notorious liar and abuser of women. But because he’s your challenger, they’re fawning over him. Can I ask you how you see this? Is this the end of politics, or is this the essence of what politics is today?
We don’t know the answer to that question. Perhaps in a few years’ time we’ll be able to answer whether or not we’ve really seen the last of the old-fashioned politicians – let’s say our type, who base themselves on facts, programmes, work, results and responsibility. We’ll see whether a new type of politician has emerged. What I see is like what the old Szekler says about a giraffe: “Very nice, but I wouldn’t want one in my home…”
Áron Ambrózy: If we’re talking about facts and reality, this weekend the Tisza Party had its congress, where they almost managed to present candidates; but then they said that they wouldn’t, and that now they’d present their programme – thus proving their ability to govern to us. In connection with this, my question is, when in 2009 and 2010 you were preparing to govern, what kind of congresses did you hold? Was there ever a time when Mihály Varga and Tamás Deutsch sat down in a panel discussion and talked about how the focus of their governance would be on the people?
Stupendous…
Áron Ambrózy: Or was it a bit more complicated?
I’d rather say – and we’re getting to the heart of things – that we’ve always had an organised political community called a party. This means that we have members, we have groups, we have local leaders, we have responsibilities, we have accountability – and so we operate like an organisation. What we’re facing here isn’t that. What you’re talking about – Tisza – is a digital political movement. They have no party – if “party” means what we understand it to mean: candidates, members, responsibilities, powers, a programme. It’s a digital political movement. We’re talking about something very serious, because this type of digital movement could easily replace traditional political parties. We don’t know the answer to that either – whether it will or won’t. What I do know is that we have a large political community – a party and its supporters – which by European standards is unprecedentedly successful. On the other side there’s a digital political movement, but not a party. For a long time we didn’t have a digital political movement. A year ago at Tusnadfürdő I announced the Fight Club, stating that we needed young people who were ready for action, who wanted to fight; and we started it sometime a few months ago. So we now have a semi-digital political movement. I can’t prove this at all, and science can’t prove it, because we’re in a kind of transitional period, but my hypothesis is that in this modern world we need a political party – a traditional, well-organised, traditional political party – and we need a digital political movement. Of these two we have one and a half. Our opponents have one. This is the situation now.
Zsolt Bayer: I promise you now that soon we’ll be asking questions for which there are concrete answers.
For example, I could put a side question to myself so that I could answer it. For example, what did two future ministers talk about at the Fidesz congress on the eve of entering government? They’d probably have talked about how we did it before. Because we had prior experience, between 1998 and 2002. We could say, “We did this, we did that, we did the other, but Gyurcsány and co. smashed up this and that. We’ll carry over what was good from that period and we’ll leave behind what was bad, we’ll forget Gyurcsány and co., thank you very much!” That’s probably what we’d have talked about. And if we had a congress like this now, in which we were talking, I’d probably say that in 2022 we made some commitments, and we’ve fulfilled those – over 90 per cent, I think. We’re staying out of the war – even if the Brusseleers raise hell. There can be no question of migrants entering – even if Brussels adopts the migration pact that it’s agreed. At the same time as the 2022 election in Hungary there was a vote on gender: a referendum. We made a commitment to passing a law banning gender in Hungary, whatever happened. We’re doubling the child tax credit. We’re implementing Europe’s biggest programme of tax cuts. We’re pushing through implementation of the thirteenth month’s pension. We committed to all of these things. Digital political movement here, Tisza there, I’m able to sit here calmly now because we made commitments in 2022, and if I have to stand up – and sooner or later the campaign will come and I’ll have to stand up – I can say, “Look, we’ve done more than 90 per cent of them.” Why would the election result in 2026 be any different than it was in 2022? So I’ll be going into this election with a sense of calm. The only disruptive new circumstance is that the opposition – the old opposition – has been removed, and in its place a digital political movement has been created. This is something new, and we don’t yet know what effect it will have. But I don’t think that real achievement can be trumped by any digital movement.
Áron Ambrózy: But doesn’t charisma trump performance? It’s my experience that nowadays a broad mass of people don’t expect a politician – or a would-be politician – to understand their profession, or to have any understanding of the field to which a given political community will delegate them: they expect a politician to be a good person. There was a kind of 19th-century Puritan idea in the world that good people do good things and bad people do bad things – so people’s only task is to vote for good people.
Yes, this is a real problem, a real problem in European or Western politics, which, as a lawyer, I’d describe as intent-based accountability. Western liberals indeed want to know what your intentions are – if you’re a good person, you have good intentions. That may be enough for one election, but certainly not the next. Because after four years, after you’ve been in government, they’ll say, “Well, your intentions were interesting, my dear friend, but what was the result?” This is called results-based accountability. So my answer to the question I’ve just been asked is that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. But that’s not a good reason to go to hell.
Zsolt Bayer: I think the situation is worse than that. I think my colleague Ambrózy was idealistic in saying that if you strive to be a good person, then you’re a good person, and you’ll do good things. Digital political movement or digital bluff: although I’m a boomer, for me it follows that To enter politics today – and, let’s say, to do so with the ambition of one day leading the country – one must aim to win in the digital space. But to win in the digital space, whatever that means, I think you need a set of skills that are completely different from those that are needed to run a country. To be great in this virtual space and to get as many likes as possible, I think you need to have one basic quality: a complete lack of shame. And you have to suspend your intellect. And to run a country, you need to be able to think five, ten – sorry, twenty – years ahead: you need to have a vision, you need to have something, a certain kind of restraint, in the best sense of the word.
You need to find a way to be able to talk to people seriously; because if you’re just surfing what’s happening in the digital space, then indeed facts just disappear.
Zsolt Bayer: That’s my fear.
But politics and real life are based on facts, and the strongest argument – especially for a governing party like ours – is what we’ve achieved. And if we perform well, that can’t be topped, it can’t be beaten. I’ll give you one or two examples. So from 2010 to 2025, this year, is fifteen years. Unemployment was at 13 percent – there were a million fewer jobs back then than there are now. This didn’t happen by itself, they didn’t grow out of the ground. People made all this happen: local leaders, businesses, government, the economy at the time – we made it happen together. After all, there are a million more jobs. People own between 1.1 and 1.2 million more cars than they owned earlier. I’ll say something quite basic – even primitive. Sometimes the most basic things speak the loudest. As I recall, in 2010 the average Hungarian ate 54 kilograms of meat a year. Now it’s 68! And then…
Zsolt Bayer: It shows on us…
Yes, we took on more of that. All three of us did. I think we took on a little bit more than our share… What’s more, at that time the average was, I think, 53; and poor people were at the bottom, on 44 kilograms. Now the average is 68, and those at the bottom of the scale are consuming 64 kilograms. So, if we can sit down and talk normally, we can see the same with houses, I mean housing, or the same with financial savings. So we can talk coolly and calmly about what’s going on in the country, where we’ve got to, where we can get to from here, and what route we can take to get there. And then this election can’t be lost.
Zsolt Bayer: You’re right, forgive me, you’re right, but I have to interject something here, and then I’ll back away from this topic completely. This is how it is: this is what politics should be about, because this is politics as we understand it. By comparison, I went online this morning to read the news, as I usually do, and in the media, on all the so-called serious political sites, this was the headline everywhere that grabbed your attention, in giant letters: Viktor Orbán and some kind of porn star in the same photo.
First!
Zsolt Bayer: The first photo together. Do you get it? And this is politics today. This is when I say I’m going to give all this up and go and just sit in the library.
But are we sure we’re right? I remember conversations twenty years ago, when tabloids as such first appeared in Hungary – what for some mysterious reason the British call tabloids – and we used to ponder a lot about how it could be that more people read “Blikk” than a serious daily paper. It was because the front page of Blikk always had eye-catching photographs. And what a thing it was, and they also talked about politics in the same sensational, tabloid tone. So this lament that I hear from you now isn’t unfamiliar to me.
Zsolt Bayer: True.
This has happened before. I think it’s up to us how we choose to handle it.
Áron Ambrózy: A generation ago, people were complaining that people weren’t reading serious newspapers, but Nemzeti Sport [“National Sport”].
That’s a very…
Zsolt Bayer: The most serious newspaper…
Áron Ambrózy: But in relation to tabloids.
…conservative world.
Áron Ambrózy: I’d share a little of Zsoca’s [Zsolt’s] pessimism. Imagine a game where, let’s say, Hegel would write on Facebook how to get from thesis to synthesis, and I’d go onto Facebook to argue with him. First I’d post a laughing emoji, then when he questions it I’d write, “No comment”. And then, when he asks me what I wanted to say, I’d explain to him that it’s not for nothing that today Königsberg is called Kaliningrad – because he’s talking such nonsense. Who would win that debate? Not Hegel…
Zsolt Bayer: Yes.
We don’t know that yet, but there is still a lot of road ahead for European humanity and the spirit of Königsberg. We’ll see. But the problem of education has been here in politics ever since the adoption of democracy. The tone of politics and the posture of politicians was different when only the virilists – those who were the highest taxpayers – voted, or voting was subject to a literacy census of educational attainment. The latter is something that Mi Hazánk [the Our Homeland Movement] sometimes raises. Now we have universal suffrage. You can complain about whether or not this is a good thing, but that’s how it is. The decision-making powers of a country – let’s say the distribution of power – are determined by the decision of the whole community. I think it can be said – as we’ve just been speaking about Hegel – that few people have read the relevant works, and that’s a problem; but we can frame it by saying that it’s our job as politicians to be able to explain Hegel in such a way that people can understand the problem of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.
Zsolt Bayer: Right.
This is a professional task. A complicated budgetary issue, public debt and so on can be explained in an academic way, but in a democracy that won’t get you anywhere; but you can cut through it all, get right to the heart of it, and say it in just two sentences. Those who have a talent for this should come into politics; those who don’t shouldn’t. So seriousness and comprehensibility aren’t synonymous. Admittedly, as you simplify things, some of the content will be lost. But if you’re a good politician you can get the point across to people with the most elementary education – provided you think it through in the way they do, put it into their language and say it in a way that makes them feel that it’s important for them to understand. Politics shouldn’t be about how clever you are and how you can explain a context in your own language – everyone can do that, even an academic can do that. Politics is much more than that. You have to explain it in a way that everyone can understand. It’s a big task, it’s a big challenge, and it’s getting more challenging as the virtual space gains ground. There may come a moment when even I lose track of things. For the time being, I feel that I’m holding my own, and that I have a response to these phenomena; but we’ll see where it goes. Let’s not bury politics just yet.
Zsolt Bayer: We have one minute left in the first part, and I promise that after the break we’ll get down to specifics. In this one minute let’s round off our more philosophical conversation. Winston Churchill is supposed to have said that the best argument against democracy is fifteen minutes in conversation with a voter. But what you’ve just said implies that this can be reversed: the best argument for democracy is to talk to any voter in such a way that they feel they understand what you’re trying to tell them.
And communicate the essence of it – not just that they feel it, but get the essence of it. That’s the task.
Zsolt Bayer: That’s the thing. And after the break we’ll discuss some questions that have specific answers, and we’ll try to say this – and ask you to say it – in a way that everyone can understand. We’ll take a short break and come back.
Let me start with a sad matter – one that I think is deeply distressing for all Hungarians of good conscience. We obviously don’t know exactly what happened, but in Ukraine, during forced conscription, it’s very likely that a man was quite simply beaten to death. He was beaten so badly that he later died of his injuries. What’s more, this man happened to be of Hungarian origin, and was also a Hungarian citizen – which obviously means that, because he was a member of our nation and our political community as a citizen, our responsibility as a country towards him is significantly heightened. My question to you is that we’re members of a large European political community called the European Union, and now this political community is about to propose that we should be excluded from it because, for example, we don’t want to allow bearded men dressed as women to read aberrant stories to children in kindergartens. And at the same time they’re calling for the immediate inclusion of a country where what has happened can happen. And from this point on, one stares wide-eyed – at least I do – and tries to understand, firstly, how is this possible? And secondly, what are we even doing here?
As far as the specific and tragic case is concerned, terrible things happen in a country at war – especially on the front line. And of course conscription is also difficult, and there are laws for that too. So far one can understand all that. Even in a country at war, it’s unacceptable for people to be beaten to death simply because it’s believed – rightly or wrongly, or under a false pretext – that they didn’t want to, couldn’t, or failed to report for duty when called. They can be convicted, they can be drafted, but they must not be beaten to death! So this has no place in the life of any country at war. If the person who was beaten to death was also a citizen of another country, was under its protection, and belonged to a community – the European Union – which the country at war is trying to join, then it’s absolutely out of the question. And this is the point where the European Union must not, under any circumstances, remain silent. No way! You cannot make speeches about Ukraine’s eligibility for membership of the European Union and then the next day bury people who have been beaten to death in the course of forced conscription. What Hungary can do on a national basis is to support the family. So we follow what’s happening, we see the families from which Hungarians have been taken away under forced or regular conscription, we know how many died, we know how many orphans have been left, we know the circumstances of the family, and we help them. In addition, since we’re talking about citizens of Hungary, which is a member of the EU, we’re also banging on doors in Brussels and demanding that Brussels take action against the practice of forced conscription in Ukraine.
Áron Ambrózy: And will the Hungarian government demand an international investigation, or will the Hungarian government delegate someone?
We’ve now started along two paths, and in the end we’ll arrive at that point. This must be investigated, of course.
Zsolt Bayer: Let’s stick with the European Union and the current situation. On my bad days, I think that something’s happening for which there’s only one possible explanation: the European Union is currently being run by people who are completely incompetent, not to say idiots.
That’s the optimistic scenario.
Zsolt Bayer: Yes. And yes, it may be the optimistic scenario, because if there’s some master plan – which I’m not aware of, but if there is – behind all this, say, behind the forced admission of Ukraine, then it may be even worse. Is there a master plan?
There is, and the situation is even worse than your question suggests. How we got here would require a long discussion, but perhaps I can pinpoint the moment when the turning point occurred, when normal debate gave way to what appears to be insane majority rule in Europe. It was when the British left the European Union. Until then, there had been a rough balance between two concepts with long historical antecedents, dating back to the Roman Empire. There’s always been an idea, a vision, a love in Europe for a large and unified empire modelled on the Roman Empire, or on Charlemagne’s…
Zsolt Bayer: Empire…
…great, unified European empire. And since Rome wasn’t conquered by another empire, but fell apart, giving rise to nations, there’s always been another dream: that Europe would finally be made up of nations. We arrived here as a nation. And how wonderful it is when nations maintain their differences, engage in politics according to their differing interests, and cooperate with one another where they can. This is the Europe of nations. These two trends, these two ideas, were more or less in balance. If I break it down into groups of countries, I would say that on one side we had the British and the V4 – that is the Central Europeans, who are the countries of the former Soviet bloc and who are the most sensitive about their independence and sovereignty; and on the other side we had the French–German axis. And even if this was not precisely balanced, then the British and the V4 together were largely able to prevent any move towards a United States of Europe. So the master plan is called the United States of Europe. The British left, and the V4 countries were left on their own; the Poles were overthrown, the Polish conservative government was overthrown from Brussels, the Czechs were pulled away, two of us were left, and it all fell apart. And what looks like idealism is in fact the imperial concept of building a United States of Europe – which we’re fighting against.
Áron Ambrózy: And we’re managing to fight, because as I see it fifteen years ago, for example, I’d have had no idea who, say, the European Union’s chief negotiator for foreign affairs was. But now Kaja Kallas acts as if she were the right hand of the Empress of Europe – sometimes convening ministers and assigning them tasks for how they should represent their nation states.
Yes, she’d like it to be like that, but some of the foreign ministers are strongly opposed to it. As part of this opposition Péter Szijjártó distinguishes himself. There’s a struggle in progress. In my opinion, the imperial side has the upper hand, while growing energies are emerging on the nation-state side. Therefore I believe that if we fight well, that is, if the Hungarians persevere, then we’ll be able to preserve our national sovereignty on the most important points, and the mood and political opinion within the entire European Union will shift – or rather, it’s already shifting – from the United States of Europe towards us. Migration, for example, is such a bitter experience. There’s an imperial solution to migration, called the migration pact, and there are parties in Hungary that support it: Dobrev and co., the Tisza Party, and so on. And then there are those of us who oppose it. The majority of Europeans oppose the migration pact, they’re rebelling one after the other, and ever more countries are announcing that they won’t implement it. My experience on gender issues is similar, and the same thing will happen with the Ukrainian war. So I say that if we persevere, if we hold out a little longer, we can reestablish the V4. We have a serious chance of doing so in the coming year. And by taking advantage of the change in European public opinion, we can restore the balance between imperial thinking and a Europe of nations.
Áron Ambrózy: And will playing the role of the battering ram be worth it?
We have no other choice. The question is justified: if we do the math, will it work out? In my opinion, if we accept anything that they want to force on us today, we’ll be giving up our national sovereignty and destroying the achievements of the Hungarian people over the past fifteen years. Because they want big things. We’ve been talking about war, gender and migration. Migration has been the mistake with the most terrible consequences for Europe over the past ten years. But we’d also have to abolish state-subsidised and protected energy tariffs, because they say that market prices must be applied. We’d have to reform the pension system – they’re demanding that too. We’d have to abolish interest rate regulation and state regulations that curb prices, because that’s what the logic of the market dictates. If we accept what Brussels wants, hundreds of thousands of families – but possibly two or three million – would be ruined in an instant. Therefore, if the question is whether it’s worth committing to what we’re doing, my answer is that if we don’t want to be ruined, then it’s the only thing worth committing to.
Zsolt Bayer: Let me unpack your statement that the master plan is to create a United States of Europe. I understand that. What do I mean by unpacking it? My point is this: if those who want to create a United States of Europe – the current leadership in Brussels, and indeed many national governments – take Ukraine on board as soon as possible, a country the size of Ukraine will automatically send seventy-odd representatives to the European Parliament. As I see it, this will mean that – despite the change in public opinion throughout Europe and the West – there will still be a European Parliament, and with those seventy-odd Ukrainian representatives they’ll continue to do whatever they want.
Moreover, when nations vote, not in Parliament but in the European Council where governments are represented, there will also be a weighted, combined vote in which, for example, population size will count. So, to rephrase what you’ve just asked me about into my own words, I also think that if Ukraine is admitted, then the process of creating a United States of Europe will most likely be complete. This is because Ukraine will always be on the side of the United States of Europe, the empire, as it cannot survive otherwise: it cannot exist as a nation, and is only sustained by the Brussels empire. We’re still sustaining it with Western money. So, beyond the many horrors it would cause for Hungary, beyond the war it would bring with it into the European Union, Ukraine’s accession would in fact decide the debate on the future of national sovereignty.
Zsolt Bayer: The other I’d like to unpack…
And this explains why so many people are pushing so hard for Ukraine to be accepted.
Bayer Zsolt: Clear.
Ambrózy Áron: Let me just quickly note that there’s an even more terrifying scenario, because Ursula von der Leyen is already fantasising about how good the Ukrainian army looks and that – since we’re already paying for it – it could become a European Union army. Well, I don’t want to live in a Europe in which there’s an 800,000-strong army led by a German woman.
I was sitting in the council meeting at which President Zelenskyy announced that a million-strong army must be maintained. Ukraine is willing to provide that many soldiers, and the European Union must maintain this million-strong Ukrainian army – lock, stock and barrel.
Zsolt Bayer: We’d provide the money, they’d provide the people.
Everything. Equipment, everything.
Áron Ambrózy: Right now I’d like to be teleported off somewhere.
I wouldn’t want to be neighbours with a country called Ukraine, which has an army of a million soldiers, as God alone knows where that army might turn next.
Zsolt Bayer: Let me unpack something else. For years we’ve been saying – and it’s true – that there’s a lot of American capital in Ukrainian agriculture. But we don’t usually mention – and I’d ask whether I’ve got this right – that in addition to American capital there’s also a significant amount of German, French and Italian capital invested in the ownership of Ukrainian agriculture. What am I getting at? If this is the case, and Ukraine is accepted, then almost 90 per cent or more of European Union agricultural subsidies will go to Ukraine – as we always say. Yes, but if these large countries are in the mix, then the vast majority of these EU subsidies will go back to France and Germany. I’m not saying that they’ll go back to French and German farmers, but they’ll go back to large agricultural companies.
To international companies.
Zsolt Bayer: Yes. But again it follows that they can rest easy, because it won’t be their agriculture that’s ruined. And Central and Eastern Europe – us, the Poles and Romanians – will once again be dismissed like colonies: “Who cares if Hungarian farmers go bankrupt?”
Ambrózy Áron: Can I ask a supplementary question? These large multinational corporations – which own a significant portion of Ukrainian land – have lobbyists sitting in Brussels.
Of course! If we look at the bigger picture beyond agriculture, the most reliable study I’ve come across in the last twenty years was written by the Poles, referring to German sources. It said that 80 per cent of the funds transferred to us from the EU were returned to the donor countries – primarily Germany – through various channels.
Zsolt Bayer: That’s right.
This is a reliable estimate in a major study that sparked serious debate at the time. I don’t think this ratio will change in the event of Ukraine’s accession. Or if it does change, it will go up rather than down, given the limited nature and extent of local Ukrainian capital. The assumption of many people in Brussels today is that Ukraine’s accession will involve financial sacrifices, but that the money will eventually return to our – I mean their – international companies, as happened when Central Europe joined. I don’t think this is an unreasonable assumption, and it’s particularly true for agriculture. And it’s not unreasonable to assume that they’re not interested at all in what happens to the countries of Central Europe. But we are interested in that; and this is a good argument for the Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, Czechs – and perhaps even the Romanians – to come to their senses and form a Central European alliance against Ukraine’s accession. This isn’t imminent, but it’s not very far off either. In ever more countries – including Poland – public opinion is shifting and saying, “Folks, let’s stop. They want to admit Ukraine to the EU in one fell swoop by 2030. Let’s stop this, let’s calm down, let’s do the math, let’s multiply and divide, and let’s oppose Ukraine’s membership.” So in Central Europe this sentiment is very close to becoming the prevailing public mood. This is already the case in Hungary – except for Tisza Party supporters, fifty-odd per cent of whom said in a party poll that they’d be very, very happy if Ukraine were to become a member of the European Union.
Zsolt Bayer: That’s true. But let’s add right away that while fifty-odd per cent said that, forty-odd per cent voted the same way as the more than two million who said in [the consultative referendum] Voks2025 that such a thing is out of the question.
This is the optimistic world.
Zsolt Bayer: This is the optimistic world.
Áron Ambrózy: What positive outlook do we have for Ukraine? Obviously, Ukraine shouldn’t join in the short to medium term, but in the long term, I think we should open up some small opportunities for them, so that they have a future that’s better than being destroyed by this endless war.
I think this is a logical requirement for European policy – not only morally, but also based on our national interests. If not membership, then what? But we must put the war at the top of the list of issues to be resolved; because as long as the war continues no other issues can be resolved, and it will be impossible to think sensibly about the post-war situation. So our first priority must be to achieve a ceasefire and peace as soon as possible, followed by a security guarantee that defines Ukraine. Because today we don’t know what Ukraine is: we don’t know where its borders are, and we don’t know how many citizens it has. We know little about it because we’re talking about a country that’s becoming increasingly involved in an increasingly serious war, and that’s being ground down and destroyed by it. This is the most important thing. Once that’s settled, an agreement must be reached with the Russians immediately. So it’s not only necessary to reach an agreement with the Ukrainians, but also with the Russians – immediately after the peace treaty or ceasefire. We need to confirm whether or not Russia will participate in the European economy, for example: whether energy and raw materials will come from there, whether we’ll participate in their economy, whether we’ll be able to export products there. And we must also agree on arms control – because if things continue as they are now, we’ll have to spend 5 per cent of our gross domestic product on weapons, and we’ll die in the process. This is unconscionable! But it’s possible to set an upper limit on arms and military spending by concluding arms limitation agreements between the opposing sides and reducing the level of arms spending, so that there’s enough money and resources for other things. So we’ll have to reach an agreement with the Russians. Once this is in place, Europe needs to form a strategic alliance with Ukraine, within which there should be regulations on how Ukraine will cooperate with the European Union without Ukraine actually being a member of the European Union – in other words, we’ll retain our detachment, and if something doesn’t work well, we’ll amend the agreements with Ukraine accordingly. If you accept them in, you’ll no longer be able to amend anything, and then you’ll see the emergence of problems that you can no longer remedy. This is why I’d follow this multi-step approach towards Ukraine, if the President of the Commission were one of us. But that will have to wait for now.
Zsolt Bayer: Prime Minister, we’re now saying goodbye to our television viewers, but you’ll be staying with us for a few more minutes, because we can continue our conversation on the internet, and I still have a few important issues to discuss. Let’s stay with the EU for a little longer for one last question – and obviously a personal one. I’d like to move on to some personal matters now. You were very close to Helmut Kohl, who I believe was the last German leader who could be called a true statesman. How can I put it? I know that the relationship between the two of you was closer and deeper than simply between the leaders of two EU or European countries.
Can I say something about that?
Zsolt Bayer: Yes.
That’s correct, and there’s a very simple reason for this. In 1998 the Hungarian people decided to entrust the governance of the country to a party called Fidesz. I was 35 years old and became Prime Minister. I formed a government in which I was the youngest member – because experience is needed. And at the first opportunity I called Helmut Kohl, who always loved the Hungarians – mainly because, as put it, the Hungarians had knocked the first brick out of the Berlin Wall. So he always believed that without Hungary there would have been no German reunification. He was the founder of the new German state – and that’s no exaggeration. So he always loved Hungary. I called him and said, “Chancellor, I’m the new Hungarian prime minister, and would it be possible for us to exchange a few words about some of the basic principles of this governmental work, this position, this challenge? I don’t want to negotiate with you, I want to talk.” He said, “My dear young friend, get on a plane, come here, I’m at your disposal.” I went to Bonn, where the German government was still based back then, and we had a very long conversation, two or three hours, during which I asked him about politics. “What advice would you give me, a 35-year-old man? What should I pay attention to? What do I need to know about Americans? What do you think about the Russians? How will the European economy develop?” Hungary wasn’t a member of the EU at the time, so I wanted to know how I could modify the negotiations to make them successful. So I tried to learn some trade secrets and professional insights from him, and over a number of hours he gladly explained everything to me, calmly and thoroughly. We remained in contact, and after he lost the election in 1998 a very serious smear campaign was launched against him. Everyone betrayed him, everyone turned their backs on him – Angela Merkel was the first, followed by the others, and he found himself in an unfair and undeserved situation. And then his illness began to take an increasing toll on him. From the moment he left office until his death, I visited him every year, I talked to him, gave him all the care and attention I could – if I may put it that way – and invited him to Hungary while he was still able to travel. And when he was no longer able to travel, I always went to see him. I repaid the gesture of friendship which he gave me after sixteen years as Chancellor, and I maintained this special relationship with him until the end of his life. This was so much the case that after his burial, after the funeral service in the church, just a few family members and a small Hungarian delegation headed by me stood at his graveside. We were that close to the Kohl family – which wasn’t an easy thing, because it was a complicated, divided family.
Zsolt Bayer: And that’s precisely why I dare to ask this question – because you knew him so well and talked to him a lot. Imagine if, by the grace of God, Helmut Kohl were to return to us now – even if only for a week – and see today’s Europe and the European Union. If then he said, “Viktor, come, let’s talk a little”, what do you think he’d say about the Union today?
I remember the time when he came to campaign, perhaps during the 2004 European Parliament elections – but now, like in a song by Tamás Cseh, “the ‘dram-sized’ governments are blurred in my head”. But I invited him, and we held a large rally in Győr. The main square was packed with people: flags, a fantastic sea of Hungarian flags, national flags: “You’re beautiful, you’re radiant, Hungary…” So the whole thing took flight. And we stood there on the stage, and the old gent said to me, “My dear friend, back in Germany it would no longer be possible to hold such a rally.” I remember that well. And that was only in 2004! Well, now I think that it’s a correct statement if a Hungarian says that we – I mean we Hungarians – want to be a country like Germany was fifteen years ago or ten years ago. Because even in the final years before the migrant crisis, Germany was indeed the strongest country in Europe. Migration has ruined them. People say that the decline in its competitiveness isn’t caused by migration, but I think that the two things are related. And German identity was shaken when they took in all these migrants, when they laid down their arms and said that Islam is part of German culture. And then when they brought in gender… So Germany began its rapid transformation, which somehow started in the mid-2010s and continues to this day. I don’t know what the Germans will make of this, because at some point there will be a Germany again – but what it will be like with such a burden on its back is difficult to say. I can say with certainty, however, that Helmut Kohl wouldn’t recognise the Germany we know today.
Áron Ambrózy: I think that when the Germans try to solve this problem of migration, we shouldn’t even dare to look at what they’ll do.
They can’t solve it. This is the problem that we underestimate – and it’s a mistake, because we should learn from it. If you let them in and legalise their residence, from that point on they are you, they’re part of Germany. Of course the process culminates in citizenship, but once you let them in and allowed them to stay, from that point on, if you’re a freedom-loving person who respects human dignity, then you have to say, “I let them in, they’re here, they’re part of Germany”. This is even though they’re completely different from you, even though when you look at them, listen to them, go up to them and talk to them, you see that this is a different world. But now they’re here, you’ve left them in, they’re inside, they’re also a part of Germany. And then there’s no solution like the one you’re talking about, but it’s over: then the Germany that existed before you let them in is finished. Because from now on this is their Germany too. So although I’m generally a gentle person, even meek, and I try to agree with everyone, for Hungary I’m extremely vehement about this: migrants cannot be allowed in here, and they can never be accepted; they mustn’t be given any legal status – because we’d be finished, there would be no turning back. I see how the others have fallen, and I don’t want my country to end up like that. This is why we must resist until our last breath.
Áron Ambrózy: And as for the root causes of migration, here I think that for the Germans this wasn’t a tragedy that came out of nowhere, with numbers equivalent to the population of Slovenia arriving every year. Instead they spent decades building a system in which Germans didn’t have to work. Germans had done enough: the previous generation had worked, but their sons and daughters became sociologists, artists, perhaps climate researchers, or maybe activists. But the physical work would be done by people who come from the third world. And obviously the consequence of this is that if a country’s population is unwilling to do the work necessary to maintain that country, then someone else will come and do it for them. And then they can’t say to them, “Oh, you’re not citizens…”
I believe that this issue, Germany’s internal transformation, is also worth discussing. And this is why it’s very important that in Hungary, for example, foreign workers can only stay here for a limited number of years. Their stay must be interrupted so that they don’t become eligible to stay here under EU law. After that it can be extended once more, but it must be interrupted once. What I mean by this is that the law on guest workers in Hungary – which is essentially a European version of the Qatari law – is as strict as possible, and ensures that as many rights as possible are retained by the Government. In fact it doesn’t even allow more people to come in than there are existing job vacancies – because Hungary belongs to the Hungarians, and Hungarian jobs are primarily reserved for Hungarians. So it’s possible to defend against this, and we’re defending ourselves. Germany didn’t defend itself well, but the decisive blow – or the decisive knife between the ribs – was the opening of the borders in 2015; and not because they arrived in large numbers, although millions are indeed millions, but because a debate opened up about how to deal with this issue, and the Germans concluded this debate with what was essentially a declaration of surrender. They said this was good. So the end came when the German government said “We will solve this”, when it said that what was happening was good, that it wasn’t bad, that it wasn’t a problem that needed to be averted, but rather a phenomenon that needed to be handled skilfully, and then turned to their advantage. And that was the Soros Plan. It’s the master plan – because here too there’s a master plan, which liberals dispute the existence of, but it’s been published in writing, so no sane person would say that it doesn’t exist. Everyone can read with their own eyes the Soros Plan that George Soros himself published, in opposition to the Hungarian plan. If anyone remembers, this states that one million migrants must be brought in every year. It’s written down, it’s the master plan. And when the Germans were confronted with this, they didn’t react with rejection, but welcomed it. I think that was the turning point from which it’s almost impossible to turn back. I’m not saying it’s definitely impossible, because we shouldn’t give up, miracles can happen – the Germans are Germans after all, and maybe they’ll find a solution; but today I don’t see any way back to where we started from ten years ago.
Áron Ambrózy: Can I ask one more question? A short one. Which is more entertaining: talking to Zsolt here or answering a journalist’s question at an international press conference about when you’re going to retire?
That’s a close call. I’ll say a few words about retirement, if I may. Fidesz is undoubtedly a unique political entity, because it was formed in 1988 on the eve of a historic cataclysm, the fall of communism, and subsequently became Europe’s most successful political community. I was there from the very beginning, which is why the idea that it would be very difficult to imagine Fidesz without me has become so deeply rooted. But it isn’t accurate. Zsolt was also a founding member of Fidesz, and he can tell you exactly how different Fidesz would be with a different leader. The civic, national and Christian camps would also view it differently. But even if it were different it would be good, and it would look good. So I’d also like to tell you that the idea that the future of the Hungarian right depends on one person is a myth. Of course I’ll do what needs to be done – and even more than that, if humanly possible; but we must realise that this is a political community whose strength, roots, fighting spirit and energy are actually nourished by the fact that the majority of people in this country love their homeland, love their family, and, in a mysterious way, still maintain a connection with God. So among the majority in Hungary the ideas of God, homeland, family, culture and outlook on life are very strong. The question is simply how this can and should be formulated in politics. This is why succession isn’t such a sensitive issue as the Left would have us believe – as if it were a matter of life and death. The time will come for that too. And when the time comes, we’ll see it through.
Zsolt Bayer: And you know, as I thank you for this past hour, I believe that what our opponents – or at times, our outright enemies – on the other side will never understand or feel is that here there’s a political community, and within it, a team that knows this: “At any time I’d go into war alongside you, and you’d do so alongside me.” And we dare to turn our backs on one another because we know there will be no betrayal. That’s our strength, I think.
There were two major events in the modern era that bound together this political community of the Right. The earlier history shouldn’t be overlooked either, because after all the roots of this political, civic, national, Christian, conservative community go back to 1956 – and indeed to the end of World War II, when the Smallholder’s Party tried to defend the country against Sovietisation. So this is a broad trunk. But then there were two major events. In 1988 it was still impossible to know what would come of this. And then this community rose up. And those of us who were there remember everyone, so we know who was there and who wasn’t, who hid and who came forward, and who was where.
Áron Ambrózy: I wasn’t there.
Obviously a very strong bond was formed there. And then, interestingly, the younger generation also had an experience – perhaps not as shocking, but still important: in 2006, on the fiftieth anniversary of 1956, the Gyurcsány government’s violent dispersal of commemorative events. And the younger generation saw what happened there. Of course it wasn’t as brutal as the period between 23 October and 4 November 1956, but it was still brutal, showing something of the other side’s face, how far they were willing to go, and what they were capable of for the sake of power. This is why the generation that’s now around 40–45 years old has experience of this incarnation of the Left. And this has bound them very strongly to the civic, national and Christian culture and community that had been reinvigorated in 1988. This is why I say that individuals are important, and even the Prime Minister isn’t insignificant, but that in fact the most important is the trunk of the tree – and that’s very broad.
Zsolt Bayer: Thank you for accepting our invitation. Thank you for this conversation. And thank you all for your attention. We’ll meet again sometime, but until then, all the best. Goodbye.
