Zsolt Törőcsik: January is coming to an end, and with it, hopefully, the extreme cold we’ve experienced in recent weeks. The Government is compensating for the resulting surge in heating costs by giving consumers a 30 per cent exemption on January’s energy bill. I’ll be asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán why this decision was made, and how the reductions in household energy bills can be sustained under the current EU conditions. Good morning.
Good morning.
Let’s start with the 30 per cent utility bill cap. How much would families’ energy bills have increased if this measure hadn’t been taken?
We estimate that they’d have increased by 30 per cent or more. But it’s worth thinking about what would have happened to Hungarian families if the situation in Hungary were the same as in Western Europe, where there’s no such system of reductions in household energy bills as there is here. I think hundreds of thousands of families would have found themselves unable to pay their bills. We’ve become so accustomed to the idea that Hungary provides reductions in household energy bills that we don’t think about the fact that other countries don’t have them. And this is why here in Central Europe Poles and Czechs pay three times – two to three times, but some pay four times – as much as we do, not to mention the Austrians and Germans. So although it provokes a lot of debate with international companies and energy companies, today in Hungary there’s a unique system which takes the profits generated within the energy system – at least in part – away from traders and energy companies, and redistributes them in the form of subsidies, thereby driving down prices. So this is a unique system. And this is why we have to fight for it every single year – because as it’s unique, there’s nothing like it in the EU and it’s unusual, over there they want to see it killed off. After all, the big international companies have strong lobbying power in Brussels, and their profits are returned to the programme of energy bill reductions and reach families. Now we’ve been having an extremely cold spell. Winter is usually cold, and it may continue to be, because it’s not over yet; but we were faced with a major dilemma as to whether at this time the Government should only deal with those most in need, or whether it should ease the burden for everyone. And if you look into the energy consumption billing system, which is like a bottomless well, you’ll see something that will shock you. No sane person can make sense of it. I don’t think even membership of the Academy of Sciences would be enough to understand how your gas bill is calculated. Some people pay based on their meter readings, some pay a flat rate, and some pay based on a consumption curve. So we realised that if we didn’t apply a general rule it would create a lot of unfairness, and in the end – even though we’d be spending a lot of money – people would feel that the system was unfair. Therefore in the end we decided to deduct 30 per cent from everyone’s January bill: to take over 30 per cent of their consumption, of the amount consumed. We believe that this is the closest we can get to a solution, or to meeting the desire that everyone should feel that their burden has been reduced in a fair and proportionate way.
You’ve mentioned that there’s a lot of debate surrounding the reductions in household energy bills, and that there are security of supply issues, as affordable oil is needed to make this sustainable, and there are also political issues. We can see that Brussels has voted that Russian natural gas can’t be imported into the European Union from the end of 2027 onwards. In light of this, how certain is it that the reductions in household energy bills will remain in the coming period?
There are domestic political debates in Hungary surrounding the reductions in household energy bills, and this debate has also appeared in Brussels. As far as the Hungarian debates are concerned, when we introduced this system – it was so long ago that I don’t think anyone remembers it anymore, but sometime around 2013–14 – the Left attacked it, DK [Democratic Coalition] attacked it. Since then they’ve stopped doing so, because it turned out that voters want it, it’s important to them, and many families would be unable to cope without it. So DK stopped attacking it – but then Tisza came along and now it’s continuing the attack. So in Hungary today there’s a political force that’s against reductions in household energy bills and wants to abolish them: that political force is the Tisza Party. They say it’s humbug, but the most beautiful sentence I remember is this: “There are times when, if you pay more for something, it turns out to be much better.” And I wondered to myself, is that true? I don’t think so, and I’m sure that energy bills aren’t among such things. So this debate is ongoing in Hungary. It’s no exaggeration to say that one of the issues at stake in the April parliamentary election is whether or not reductions in household energy bills will remain in place. If there’s a national government, they’ll remain in place; if there isn’t a national government but a Brussels government, they’ll be abolished – not just the energy price cap introduced because of the extremely cold weather, but the whole thing as it stands. This can also be seen from the fact that the external debate – the debate in Brussels – is about whether to prevent Member States buying Russian oil and gas. Now, the basis for the reductions in household energy bills is the cheaper energy that we can buy from Russia. Without that, there can be no reductions in household energy bills. So if someone says – as Tisza’s energy policymakers say – that their goal is to break away from Russian gas and oil, then they’re also saying that the reductions in household energy bills will come to an end. The entire system will be turned upside down, and families will have to adapt to figuring out how the heck they’ll pay their bills – which will be two or three times higher – from their income, which obviously can’t grow at the same rate. So there’s a serious threat knocking on people’s doors. This battle is being fought in Brussels. Now, in order to continue the reductions in household energy bills, I’ve recently had to conduct three serious and difficult negotiations. First, I had to convince the US president – who also believes that Europe should stop using Russian oil and natural gas and who’s imposing sanctions on those who don’t stop – that he shouldn’t impose those sanctions on Hungary, because it would ruin us. Hungary is a country that can’t bring natural gas or oil here by tanker: we need pipeline deliveries. I managed to convince him of this, and we were granted an exemption. Then I needed to agree with the Russian president that even though the Ukrainians often blow up Russian energy delivery routes, pumping stations and compressor stations, the Russians will in the future still deliver the amount they’ve agreed to deliver to Hungary, as stipulated in the contract. Then I had to agree with the Turkish president that he’ll guarantee the route, and the security of the route, that transports energy – primarily natural gas – from Russia through Turkey to us, to Central Europe and Hungary. These three agreements now form the basis, the foundation, the secure foundation, for Hungary’s reductions in household energy bills. And now we have to rein in Brussels. Brussels hasn’t gone so far as to impose an immediate ban, but last week it made the decision that this will no longer be possible from 2027. This is the decision that we must eradicate.
Yes, Hungary is filing a lawsuit because of this. However, even if this lawsuit is filed now, it certainly won’t be concluded before the election. From this point of view, what could be at stake in the election? A little later we’ll come back to the fact that Tisza’s energy expert, István Kapitány, says that it’s possible to break away from Russian energy at the same time as maintaining the reductions in household energy bills.
But he’s not telling the truth. That’s impossible! So anyone who claims that the current system of reductions in household energy bills and their current level can be maintained without Russian natural gas isn’t telling the truth. It’s either one or the other – they’re linked. The starting point for the reductions in household energy bills today is precisely the fact that we can import cheaper Russian energy, take the extra profits generated from this away from the energy companies, and distribute it to ordinary people. Without this, there’s no basis for the financing of the reductions in household energy bills. Without it we’ll have to pay the market price – as they do everywhere in Europe, outside Hungary. This is a regulation issued in Brussels. We don’t want to implement it. We must change it, and we have a year and a half to do so. It’s now the end of January 2026, and we have to change it – or find a way around it – by 1 January 2027. We must avoid it at all costs. If we apply it, households will be turned upside down.
We’ll see what happens. But since the stakes in the election have been mentioned, this question isn’t only important in Hungary, but also in Ukraine, as we’re hearing increasingly strident messages from Kiev/Kyiv. According to their foreign minister, for example, you pose a threat to your own people; and in Davos Zelenskyy also criticised you harshly. Should we expect more of this in the coming two months? What are the Ukrainians aiming at with these talking points?
First of all, there’s collaboration between Brussels and Ukraine. The aforementioned Brussels regulation has been justified on the grounds that it helps Ukraine. So by not allowing the Russians to supply cheap gas to Hungary, they’re helping Ukraine. At the same time, the European Union can’t impose such a ban. So on this Brussels is colluding with Kiev/Kyiv. The fact is that the European Union’s founding treaty clearly states that it is the right of every Member State to decide what kind of energy it will use, what type, and where it will obtain it from. Brussels has no say in this. If it wants to have a say, it can do so through a so-called sanctions system, which means that sanctions must be imposed. But for sanctions to be imposed, a unanimous decision is required. This means that if, for example, there’s a country that insists on pursuing an energy policy different from that requested by Brussels, it has the right to do so and will be able to defend its interests. This is what we’ve done every time so far. Now Brussels has come up with the idea – again with reference to Kiev/Kyiv – that what it’s introducing now isn’t a sanction, but a trade policy measure. Trade policy decisions don’t require unanimity, and so Hungarian and Slovak resistance can be circumvented. But it’s quite obvious that the content of this decision is punitive; and – as every first-year law student learns – every decision, every contract, every decision must be judged according to its content, not according to what it calls itself. This is a sanctions decision. It’s being called trade policy, but in terms of its content it’s still a sanctions decision, so it should be dealt with according to the relevant rules. So Kiev/Kyiv and Brussels are colluding on this. What’s the aim of this collusion? Both Brussels and Kiev/Kyiv want a government in Hungary that will fall in line with Kiev/Kyiv, and fall in line with Brussels. In other words, they want a government that won’t oppose them. From this point of view I understand the Ukrainians, because we don’t want to send soldiers to Ukraine, while there are EU countries that have already agreed in writing to send soldiers; we’re not sending weapons, and we’re not willing to contribute to financing Ukraine from the EU budget. So we’re not sending money to Ukraine either. It’s in the Ukrainians’ interest to take our money, as they’re at war and have a plan called the “Ukrainian Prosperity Plan”, for which they’re asking for – demanding – 800 billion euros. Because over there that’s the way things are done. They’re demanding it over the next ten years. And they’re asking for, or demanding, another 700 billion for military equipment. That’s 1.5 trillion euros. This money doesn’t exist. Brussels wants to give this money because there’s an alliance between Brussels and Kiev/Kyiv. Now, either they take out a loan – which of course the Member States will have to repay, and which we reject – or Brussels has to collect more money from the Member States. Now Brussels is doing both: it wants to take out a loan and give the money to the Ukrainians, and it’s demanding more payments to Kiev/Kyiv from the Member States. This is why Brussels, together with Kiev/Kyiv, wants a government that will raise taxes, increase state revenues, and thus be able to pay more money to Brussels. This is the name of the game. So today Brussels and Kiev/Kyiv are not only interested in hacking, undermining and crippling Hungarian energy policy, but they also have a much bigger joint plan to finally have a Ukraine-friendly, Brussels-friendly government in Hungary. This is what the April election is about.
Yes, but in the meantime Tisza also says, at least officially, that it would stay out of the war – and, for example, that it doesn’t support Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the EU. If this is the case, then why would Kiev/Kyiv and Brussels still want a change of government?
Firstly, when we were last in Brussels for the Council meeting, we received a document describing what Brussels intends to do. Now, in addition to the money, it says that they want to admit Ukraine in 2027. The reason for this is that they want to give Ukraine money from the budget in the seven-year European framework starting in 2028. This means, by the way, that they’ll take this away from us, from the Central Europeans. So there’s a time limit on whether Ukraine can be brought into the EU before the start of the next seven-year budget. And there’s a document about this, about this plan. Tisza held a referendum here in Hungary. So there was a Tisza referendum on whether Tisza supporters would back Ukraine’s membership. And more than half of them backed it. So there’s a difference of opinion in Hungary because, as a result of the latest vote organised by Tisza voters, we can say that they support Ukraine’s membership. But if Ukraine were in the EU today, there would be war in Europe. So there can be no such thing as a Member State that’s at war with Russia, say, while the others watch from the sidelines. If such a situation arose, with one Member State at war, the other Member States would be drawn into the war, one after another. So it is an illusion that we could have a Member State fighting someone – what’s more, a superpower – in a very serious war for years, then becoming a member of the European Union while the other Member States stayed out of the war. Such a situation couldn’t exist! If someone’s a member of the Union and gets involved in a war, they’ll drag us into it too. Therefore in our opinion Ukraine’s membership is not only impossible to achieve quickly, but also inconceivable in any form. What’s more, it would ruin the Hungarian economy. It would do so immediately in the short term for farmers, who are already suffering due to cheaper Ukrainian goods produced in large quantities under different regulations which are appearing on the European market and destroying European farmers’ products and markets. And then, of course, we’re closest to Ukraine, so we Central Europeans – not just us Hungarians – would suffer the consequences the most. There’s cooperation between Slovak, Romanian, Polish and Hungarian farmers in order to do everything possible to stop this. But then there would be other consequences: Ukraine, being a bottomless pit, would take our money, there would be no money left for European development, the European economy would slow down – and then it would finally fall below zero. So Ukraine’s membership means war, and Europeans’ money going to Ukraine. This is the name of the battle that’s taking place in Brussels. This battle must be won. Right now it seems like a difficult battle, and there are certainly those who think it’s unwinnable; but the migration battle was like that too – we started out alone, yet we won. Most recently, when they wanted to send money to Kiev/Kyiv, there were already three of us: the Slovaks, the Czechs and us. And I can see that the European people are also rebelling against Ukraine’s membership. The people of Europe don’t want to send such sums to Ukraine, nor do they want Ukraine to join the EU. If we Hungarians and Central Europeans do the right thing, there will be an uprising, and Western European countries will also rise up and force their own governments and leaders to withdraw support from this madness. So this is a difficult match, but it’s winnable. Of course, first we have to win at home in April, and then we can win in Brussels.
Incidentally, yesterday German chancellor Friedrich Merz said that accelerated membership in 2027 is unrealistic from Ukraine’s point of view…
It’s coming together…
…but the EU’s argument for supporting Ukraine has always been – and this is an attempt to respond to basic human feelings – that the Russians are dangerous and that we must support Ukraine so that it doesn’t attack us, the European Union. Isn’t this protection worth it?
No, because the Ukrainians can’t defend Europe from Russia. The Ukrainians won’t strengthen Europe – they’ll weaken it and drag us into a war. The money we give – or want to give – to Ukraine should be spent on developing the armies and equipment of European countries. Our line of defence against Russia isn’t the Ukrainian–Russian border, but where NATO’s borders are: the eastern borders of the Central European countries. This is what we need to be able to defend. We need to assign Ukraine an intermediate status – if possible not through war, but through agreements. Europe will be safe when it has enough military power to defend itself against any attack – which isn’t the case today, so it needs to be developed. On the other hand, an agreement on Ukraine must be reached with Russia that provides a kind of security buffer, a buffer zone, a security zone for us. This obviously means that Russian soldiers can’t be stationed there. But that’s another matter, a question for negotiations, which are ongoing – and, we hope, will be concluded in the near future.
Since you’ve mentioned economic considerations, Századvég has calculated that Hungary would receive a bill of 5.7 trillion forints for Ukraine’s financing, which would amount to an average burden of 1.4 million forints per Hungarian household. How would this affect the value of the additional benefits due to be received in February by those who are eligible: family tax allowances, personal income tax exemptions, and the salary increases at the beginning of the year?
We’re talking about 5.652 trillion forints – or 5.6529 trillion to be precise. If we were to distribute this among Hungarian families, it would amount to 1.4 million forints per household. I’ll just say that these figures are always underestimated: they ask for a certain amount, and then it turns out that it’s never enough, and it goes even higher. So once you open this door, you can’t close it again. This would mean that Hungary would have to pay more into the EU, which is what Brussels is now demanding: that we pay more. How can we pay more? Brussels says: “Abolish the household energy subsidies and send the money to Brussels; raise taxes and send the extra money to Brussels.” So it’s telling us what to do. “Abolish the thirteenth month’s pension and send the money to Brussels.” So they have an idea of how to transform the Hungarian economy to enable Brussels to get more money from Hungary. This is called “convergence”. If I understand correctly, this is the name given to Tisza’s economic programme – which they deny exists, but which we know does exist, having not only authors, but now even eyewitnesses. So Tisza’s economic programme is a convergence programme that satisfies the demands coming from Brussels, which are being made of Hungary so that Brussels will have more money to finance the war in Ukraine. The other option is for Brussels to take out a loan – most recently 90 billion. It will take out a loan on the financial markets, let’s say from bankers, and then lend this money to Kiev/Kyiv on the understanding that the latter will pay it back – after which we’ll then pay it back to the bankers. But any child could tell you that Kiev/Kyiv won’t be able to repay a penny even over the next few hundred years – because how could it? So when these loans mature, Kiev/Kyiv won’t be able to pay, and then we’ll have to repay the money to the bankers: our children and grandchildren will have to pay. So what the EU’s doing now is in part extorting money from Member States, and in part destroying the future of our children and grandchildren. This is why we Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians haven’t got involved in this 90-billion-euro loan.
Could the budget compensate for this additional burden of 1.4 million forints, or how could families possibly manage this?
They’d take it away from them, if a Brussels government came in. There have been Brussels governments in Hungary before: there was the Gyurcsány government and the Bajnai government; they didn’t ask the people – they took their money and that was that. That’s how it would be. Now it’s not like that: we have a national government and we’ve cured ourselves of that. The national government doesn’t accept instructions from Brussels: it filters them, it transforms them, it circumvents them. It transforms them so that they’re good for Hungary. But this hasn’t always been the case: it’s only in the last fifteen years that we’ve become accustomed to the fact that, of course, Hungary has a national government, and so we’re protected – for example, from the nonsense or excessive demands coming from Brussels. But if there’s a Brussels government, then this barrier won’t exist.
Speaking of extra allowances, today the six-month bonus for armed personnel will be paid to eligible law enforcement officers. Why are they the ones receiving this amount?
We paid it three or four years ago. Our plan was to pay the bonus for armed personnel every four years, at least every four years – or preferably every three years. This is a special element in Hungarian society. We’re now talking about police officers, soldiers and firefighters who carry weapons. Of course there are others who serve within the Hungarian state to make people feel safe, to ensure that their children receive a proper education, or to heal Hungarians: those who work in healthcare. But what distinguishes those who carry weapons from all other public servants is that their oath is to protect the interests of the country. Police officers take an oath to risk their lives, and soldiers take an oath to sacrifice their lives. This is a strong commitment that I think needs to be recognised. So extra recognition is due to anyone who enters public service on the understanding that they’ll perform their duties at the risk of their own lives – or, like soldiers, even sacrifice them if necessary. This is why we call it the firearm bonus. They’re the ones who defend Hungary’s security with firearms – whether through border control, military preparedness, or public safety and order on the streets. And in recent times they’ve done their job well. One could argue against this firearm bonus if it were possible to say, “Yes, yes, but the quality of the work isn’t what we’d like it to be.” But in fact they’re doing a good job. First of all, Hungary is one of the safest countries in Europe. The fact that there are no new police jokes always means something – it means that the profession is being reevaluated, doesn’t it? There used to be “peasant” jokes, but those disappeared as Hungarian agriculture and the prestige of Hungarian agriculture grew. So today that sector is no longer looked down on – and neither is the police force. After all, these are well-educated people; serious education is required for the job, and they do their job well. And the army has also accelerated its training regime, adapted to the war situation, and launched developments. It’s carried out internal restructuring, with some people having to leave the service and others joining, and the requirements increasing. So I think… Disaster management is performing excellently, as we saw most recently in the snow situation. So they deserve this preference in their favour.
I’ve been asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán about subjects including the reductions in household energy bills, further support for Ukraine, and the six-month bonus for armed personnel.
