Zsolt Törőcsik: Ursula von der Leyen is asking Member States for an additional 135 billion euros – or roughly 54 trillion forints – over two years, in order to finance Ukraine. In a letter written this week, the President of the European Commission has conveyed this information to the leaders of the Member States. I’ll be asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán what Hungary’s response is. Good morning.
Good morning.
Have you already responded to von der Leyen’s letter?
I’ve written it. But our minister for European affairs, Professor János Bóka, is an expert – if I may put it that way – in this field, this difficult field; he was in America this week, and I don’t want to send the letter until I’ve discussed it with him – not only on the phone but also in person, sentence by sentence, word by word. But I’m ready. And I must say that it’s turned out to be a good letter: I’ve managed to gather my thoughts, and my letter to the President contains not only a specific rejection of her request for money, but also a clear strategic justification and recommendations.
What recommendations does it contain, or what reasons does it give for rejecting the request?
The essence of my proposal, as confirmed by late-night news reports yesterday, is that we must turn back from the road that’s proved to be a dead end in European politics. To my mind, today the primary problem is no longer the Ukrainian–Russian war, which is of course the root cause of everything: the really big problem is that Europeans have decided to go to war. So today it isn’t just a matter of finding a solution to end the Russo–Ukrainian war as soon as possible with a ceasefire or peace, but also of preventing Europeans from getting involved in this war. They’ve made – and continue to make – decisions focusing on building a war economy, on Russia’s military defeat of Ukraine, on long-term war plans, and on an arms programme that will take us to the cleaners. From the statements of quite a few powerful leaders, and from discussions in which I was personally present, it’s clear from the opinions expressed that they’re not just stumbling into this, but that a deliberate decision is being made on behalf of the whole of Europe: they want to go to war. And an American peace proposal or a ceasefire or a peace ending the Russo–Ukrainian war is no longer just about saving the lives that have been – or are being – destroyed on the Russo–Ukrainian front, it’s no longer just about not continuing to incinerate money unnecessarily on a war that cannot be won; it’s also about holding Europeans back from their intentions to go to war.
Yes, it’s interesting, by the way, that there have been leaks, or that we’re reading more and more about the peace plan that the American side has now put back on the table. Western Europe has been very dismissive of it, but the Ukrainians have shown openness to it, with President Zelenskyy saying that he’d like to discuss it with Donald Trump. So how long can Europe limit or prevent peace efforts?
If you’ll allow me, I’d like to return to the previous question, because we didn’t finish it. The President of the Commission Committee, Madame Ursula, is asking for money. She wants to raise 135 billion euros. And in my letter I clearly state that the Hungarians’ money belongs to the Hungarians. Hold your horses! And we’re not willing to take large sums of money out of the Hungarian budget – for example, at the expense of family support, the pension system or business support – and transfer that money to Brussels, for it then to be sent to Ukraine. Due to the corruption cases in Ukraine that have come to light this week, we don’t know exactly what would happen to these sums. The President’s other proposal is that if we provide the money from our own budgets, then we should take out a joint loan. This means that instead of taking a large amount from the current budget, we’d have to take an annual amount out of our grandchildren’s budget, which they now want to burn on the front lines. And her third proposal is to use the seized Russian currency reserves for war purposes, which is absurd: it would inevitably destabilise the entire global economic system, the international system for managing foreign exchange reserves – or its European leg. So we cannot support that either. So that’s how it stands. Now, in this context, her letter is the written, financial version of the intention, “Go to war, we Europeans”. In this regard the news officially broke late last night, because, as an aside, I’ll say that we knew negotiations were taking place: we’d seen suspicious Russian and Ukrainian cars driving around the streets of Miami! I’m joking, of course: there’s no Hungarian intelligence service office in Miami. But everyone knew that something was happening there, and now it’s been officially confirmed that there’s a 28-point American peace plan, which the Americans have handed over and the Ukrainians have officially received. And this peace plan contains proposals that have already been discussed between the Russians and the Americans. We’re now, I believe, at a decisive moment. The next two to three weeks will be crucial, as the first official reactions to this 28-point proposal will be made and something will begin to unfold, with the Budapest peace summit approaching.
This may bring us closer to the Budapest peace summit.
Now that this proposal has been made public and officially recognised, it’s the next extremely important step leading to the Budapest peace summit.
Yes, but in the meantime Brussels is rejecting this plan, because they say it would lead to an unjust peace; and Ursula von der Leyen is still asking for this money. Incidentally, this is roughly equivalent to distributing 5.5 million forints to every Hungarian; that’s how one should imagine the size of this sum of money.
Good idea! It’s a pity that there’s no such sucker in the world who’d give us the money. But they see us as suckers who will give it away.
Yes, but in the meantime, ever more details are emerging about the corruption scandal that’s rocking Ukraine, which you’ve also referred to. How risky is it to give Ukraine money at all, regardless of the amount?
In connection with this corruption scandal we’ve learned two things about how the Ukrainian war mafia operates. One is that large sums of money are disappearing and not reaching the places where Europeans and Americans sent them. The other is that Europe has no control over where the money goes: it has no control system or mechanism with which to track where the money ends up. So normally when I give money I record in the agreement what channels the money will go through and where it will end up. And, as the donor, I have the opportunity to check at certain points whether the money has actually been spent as agreed. But it seems that here no such mechanism exists – in fact, the EU doesn’t even want one to exist. Late last night I spoke with Péter Szijjártó, who’s currently in Brussels attending a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council. He reported to me on the discussion among foreign ministers, at which we proposed that if no such mechanism or control system exists, then we should create one. We could suspend the funds sent there until we clarify whether we can track how they’re being spent. But this was swept off the table. So not only do the Europeans not have such a control system, but they don’t even want to set one up, instead pouring money into Ukraine without accountability or control.
In fact at the council of foreign ministers yesterday it was also said that the corruption scandal is another argument in favour of Ukraine’s EU membership – because if they were EU members, such scandals could be avoided. Did this argument convince you?
Here I’m stuck. I’ve heard a lot of things, the Hungarian prime minister should be sufficiently bold, on the ball and capable of reacting to everything immediately, but this is an argument that astonishes even me. So, if I understand correctly, if you can’t operate properly functioning financial systems, we’ll bring you into a common financial system – because if you’re part of it, you won’t be able to cheat. At the outbreak of the war, the Western Balkans, Serbia and the other countries, were asking if they understood correctly that while they hadn’t been able to make progress on EU membership for a decade or a decade and a half, Ukraine – which hadn’t even been considered for EU membership – had suddenly jumped ahead of them because of the war, and had become the number one candidate. And they’re asking whether they’re right to think that if they were to start a war, their accession negotiations would also speed up; and by the same logic, if they were to engage in a little corruption, they’d be able to give the EU an argument as to why they should be accepted more quickly. The whole thing is so sick and absurd that words fail one. The prerequisite for EU membership is that you meet a certain standard. So, despite all its flaws, one of the greatest ideas of the past hundred years is the European Union: cooperation between European countries. But this cooperation must be of high quality, and participation should be restricted to those who are capable of running their governments and economies at a high standard. There are a few indicators for this: if you achieve them, we’ll take your application seriously; if not, you can’t join. There’s never been a case of someone arguing for EU membership on the grounds that they’re completely unsuitable and don’t meet any of the criteria – for example because corrupt systems operate in their country, but that if they’re accepted they’ll improve. There’s never been such a case! As I say, in my thirty-five years of diplomatic experience the whole thing is such an unexpected lightning bolt of an argument that it simply leaves one speechless. And one is always reminded that ours is a beautiful profession, because what seems absurd today may come up as an argument in serious negotiations tomorrow. So this is an extremely innovative profession. But joking aside, we have to say that this argument clearly shows desperation. From this convoluted argument it’s therefore completely obvious that, in terms of the quality of its internal functioning, Ukraine isn’t – and won’t be – in a position to be considered for membership of the European Union in the foreseeable future. This is quite apart from the fact that the war makes it impossible in the first place; because if Ukraine were a member of the European Union today, the European Union – including we Hungarians – would be at war with Russia. We’re not at war with the Russians today because Ukraine isn’t a member of the European Union. If it were, we’d be at war. Why would we take it on?
Now, to sum up what we’ve said so far, Brussels continues to see support for Ukraine as the solution to the situation, von der Leyen’s asking for money, but Hungary isn’t giving any. How can Hungary stay out of this collective support?
By standing its ground. The fort is manned. So one must resist. There are two major issues, two exceptionally important issues in European politics – alongside several minor ones – that currently occasion significant Hungarian resistance. One is the war, and the other is migration. Migration is an older issue, and the war is a newer one. Now, when I look for an answer to the question of how to avoid the pressure of the war or participation in the war, my answer – because politics is a discipline based on experience – is that we must do exactly as we did when we avoided migration. Hungary managed to stay out of the crazy mistake that other European countries made by letting in migrants and transforming themselves into a system of immigrant societies; and if we’ve been able to stay out of that, well, the same smarts, skill and strength are needed to stay out of the war. Our experience of staying out of the migration battle is that it was due to the strong will of the people. So if Hungarians were to expect the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister – or perhaps the Minister for European affairs – to go there and, through wit, cunning or heroism keep Hungary out of the war, which the Hungarian people are watching with interest, then the deeply respected Hungarian people would be making a big mistake: the country’s leaders cannot achieve this alone. If the country’s current leadership isn’t backed by very strong popular unity, a commitment to peace and a nationwide anti-war sentiment, then the leaders won’t be able to keep the country out of the war. I believe that this is what’s in the hearts and minds of the Hungarian people, in their historical experience, in their instincts, in their guts: we’re all anti-war and pro-peace, but we must express this – just as we did with migration. This is why the ongoing petition and national consultation are so important, as they ultimately point in the same direction: that Hungarians’ money belongs to Hungarians, and Hungary doesn’t want to go to war. It doesn’t want to send soldiers, weapons or money to be burned there. So this broad, unified national stance will help our leaders at the diplomatic negotiations in Brussels to stay out, to keep Hungary out of the war.
Is there domestic consensus on this at the political level, or does this battle have to be fought in Budapest as well as in Brussels?
This is a major battle with Brussels, in which the Hungarian opposition – including both DK [Democratic Coalition] and Tisza – is on Brussels’ side. So I don’t know if Hungarians are aware, but perhaps they are, that this isn’t just a matter of the Hungarian government going to Brussels and finding itself at odds with the other European countries: It goes to Brussels and finds itself confronted by the warmongers, including DK and Tisza, who represent a pro-war, pro-Ukrainian position in the European Parliament. In the case of DK this is old news. We know that when there’s a left-wing government in Hungary it’s not actually the elected leftists that govern, but Brussels. But the same is true for Tisza. So it’s quite obvious – and easy to see from events in Brussels – that Tisza has two missions. The party was created in Brussels, it’s financed from there, and it’s kept alive from there. That party has two missions: to break the resistance of Hungarians to the war, and to break the resistance of Hungarians to migration. This is why there’s no consensus at home, and why in Brussels we also find ourselves opposed by Hungarians or people who call themselves or define themselves as Hungarians – which is their right, I don’t dispute that.
Let’s stay with Brussels for a moment, but move on to economic issues – because, as you know, here at home this week an 11-point economic action plan to help small businesses was announced. And you’ve said that instead of Brussels’ war economy policy, you’re building a national Hungarian economy policy. In an economy as interconnected as that in Europe, how independent can you be from what’s happening there, and how independent can you be in building your economic policy?
This is also a struggle for the interests of Hungarians – one in which I’ve been involved for a decade or so. This is perhaps less obvious to Hungarians, because the war is, after all, a spectacular conflict that’s highly visible. Migration is even more so, because Hungarians experienced how hundreds of thousands of people flooded in or marched through here in 2015. So both of our conflicts, both of the issues – the war and migration – in which we must stand up for our interests, are spectacular and relatively limited in time. The economy is a different matter: it’s a minefield of a different nature. There, behind the scenes, negotiations, wrestling matches and arm-wrestling are part of everyday life. Even a small European Union regulation affects a Danish, Irish, German or Hungarian company differently – even if they’re in the same sector. And these interests must be reconciled. So at any given time Hungarian economic representation must make use of the best minds, must work hard, be up to date and wily, in order to ultimately steer and shape things – even without engaging in open conflict – so that Hungarian interests are included in the final agreement. This is the basic situation from which we must answer your question: In such a system is it possible to pursue a successful national economic policy that deviates from the general economic direction of the EU? I can report that it is possible: we’ve been doing so since 2010. Look at the deep structure of the Hungarian economy – not just that it’s privately owned, capital-based, a private economy, and so on with market regulatory systems, but look behind these: at the social welfare system, labour regulations, the tax system, the linking of family support and employment issues. These are the subtle details of the underlying structure of an economic system. And what you find there, at that level of detail, is that the Hungarian economy differs in fundamental ways from all other Western European economies. A striking manifestation of this is that the Hungarian economy is based not on individuals but families. So all the regulations that exist in economic life in Hungary are based on the fact that in real life there are families. So we have a family-based economy; meanwhile in Western Europe they see individuals, they see an individual-based economy. Another striking difference that’s clearly visible is that in our country full employment is a national goal. In the West they believe that capitalism sometimes leads to full employment and sometimes doesn’t, and that the state should come to terms with this idea. We don’t live our lives that way. Obviously this is because Hungary has lost its mines, its forests and its oil fields, meaning that Hungary has no natural resources, and so Hungary can only live off what it works for – either with its brains or its muscles. So everything that exists in this country is thanks to the personal efforts of Hungarians, which is why we believe that work is the key issue. If there’s no work, there’s nothing; but if there’s work, there’s everything – or everything’s possible. This is why in Hungary it’s a national goal to operate an economic system that provides work – in one form or another – for every Hungarian. Western Europe doesn’t think this way. In our country, at least as long as we have a national government, we can expect to operate an economic system that aims for full employment in the longer term. These differences may only be of interest to experts, but it’s worth everyone knowing that the way we’ve organised our economy since 2010 is fundamentally different from the way Western European economies are organised – and that it’s based on being able to operate our economy without migrants. We’ve organised an economic system that we can operate without migrants, with only Hungarians – or at most with the occasional and temporary involvement of some guest workers. But the latter is a supplementary element, not an essential one. By contrast, migration in Western Europe is also a means of replenishing the labour force, and it’s encoded in Western European economic systems for them to try to operate the economy through some form of settlement of immigrants to make up for the labour shortage. But our economic system is one that doesn’t require migration.
But isn’t this economic system too expensive? Because the 11-point package that’s just been announced will cost 80–90 billion forints – and this doesn’t even include family support. Economists associated with the Tisza Party, for example, say that a lot has already been spent on supporting businesses, and the family support system is generous.
All of this is true, of course; but that’s what the economy is for, isn’t it? So, the Tisza Party’s economic “bigwig” is a banker. He was one of my state secretaries for a year and a half. We parted ways because his thinking on economic policy was like that of a banker, to put it mildly. For example, he didn’t support my decision to send the IMF home. And he didn’t support the family tax credit system – something which will always be alien to a banker, who sees numbers, not people. That’s what the Tisza Party is like. That’s why they want to tax pensions, raise personal income tax, and – based on bankers’ logic – to take more money from people in general, in order to achieve greater macroeconomic financial stability. You can think that way, but that’s another world, the world of the Left. For us the economy is about people. Of course we’re required to follow important rules, because there must be financial balance, there must be operational security. There are basic financial expectations of a financial system, and it cannot collapse, because then everyone loses out. But the financial system doesn’t exist to make bankers a lot of money: it exists to ensure that there are sufficient resources in the economy and that those who want to work can find a job, produce value, and live well. What’s the purpose of the economy if not to enable people to live well? Of course, living well requires effort, but this must be created within the economy. This is why I never look at the numbers; that’s important, and Minister Márton Nagy will look at them, but the most important thing is what kind of life grows out of this economy. And the life that a national government can grow out of national economic policy is an economic system that provides the foundations for a more generous, better, higher quality, humane and happier life. So the life that grows out of our economic system is, in my personal opinion, much more attractive than anything the Left has ever been able to offer – either in Europe or in Hungary.
Let’s talk briefly about one more thing, because this week for the first time we saw the Tisza Party’s candidates for the National Assembly. You’ve written that it’s the same left-wing congregation as four years ago. Why do you think this? Because looking at the names, we see – as the Tisza Party also emphasises – that these are new faces.
First of all, I wish success to everyone. Anyone in Hungary who undertakes to participate in public life and is willing to devote some of their energy to the public good through politics – beyond their own personal or family well-being – deserves every recognition. So I’m glad that there are such people in Hungary. But when I look at them, I still see the same pattern: this is a country of ten million people, and there isn’t a big enough pool of high-quality individuals, so to speak, to fill three or four different political parties. This is a country that’s always had two parties and will always have two parties. Of course there are smaller parties that can still be found in the political arena, but there will always be two dominant players: there are those on the Left and those on the Right. And when I look at them, those on the Right are all people who, somewhere at some time in the past, have been involved in some organisation or programme on the Right; and exactly the same holds true for those on the Left. And our intellectual structure is the same: there are people with nationalist sentiments, they are on the Right; and there are internationalists, who, now that [Soviet] Moscow is no more, want to serve Brussels – people who hope for help from abroad, from the international Left. They’re on the Left. That’s the situation. Therefore, while congratulating the candidates and wishing them every success, I can only say that from our perspective – that is, from the national perspective – they’re too left-wing: too pro-Brussels, too pro-Ukrainian, and therefore left-wing.
I’ve been asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán about subjects including Brussels’ plans for financing Ukraine, the chances for peace, and support for small businesses.
