Máté Gerhardt: Trump and Putin are meeting in Alaska on Friday. The stakes are war or peace. My guest here in the studio is Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Welcome.
Hello.
Máté Gerhardt: And György Nógrádi, security policy expert. Welcome.
György Nógrádi: Thank you very much.
Máté Gerhardt: An interesting situation has developed, as European leaders are now scrambling to get on the phone to talk to President Trump before he sits down to negotiate with President Putin. But among all the European leaders, the US president quoted you – and you alone. How significant do you think it is that President Trump quoted your opinion and your views on the Russo–Ukrainian war?
One shouldn’t exaggerate one’s own importance, because that can lead to big problems. Instead one should see this as a reflection of the simple fact that in our line of work – in politics or state leadership – what gives one authority is the number of years spent in the profession. So whoever has been there the longest is the most experienced. Contrary to popular belief in Hungary, politics isn’t a theoretical discipline, but an empirical and practical one – and it’s obvious that those who have been in office the longest have the most experience and are the most practiced. And since I’ve been in office longer than anyone in Europe, it seems quite obvious that if someone’s curious about something, they should first ask the Hungarian prime minister – I’m not saying he should be consulted first and foremost, let’s be modest, but he should be among the first. I think this reflects well on Hungary – not particularly on me or particularly on the country, but rather on the country’s stability. We’re talking about a country that has had the same political leadership for a long time, which in diplomacy is a fantastic advantage – and now we’ve seen a manifestation of this.
Máté Gerhardt: Yes, it’s interesting that, at the same time, the European Council in Brussels wanted to issue a statement specifically about the meeting, about Ukraine’s EU membership and accession – and you vetoed it. This raises the question of why you vetoed it. Before anyone says anything and draws conclusions, what was the reason for vetoing this joint statement?
I had two reasons for doing so, but perhaps the Professor will find others. The first was that it contained a completely clear, straightforward sentence about Ukraine’s EU membership. But the Hungarian people have already decided on this. They said “No, Ukraine will not become a member of the European Union.” I will not sign any declarations that contain statements to the contrary. We live in a democracy, and I’m bound by the opinion of the Hungarian people. Secondly – and this is a different kind of comment I’m about to make – in politics authority counts. So you must never appear ridiculous and pathetic, because then you’ll end up being weak and pathetic. So when two leaders – of the Americans and the Russians – sit down to negotiate, one should ask where the Europeans are. But if the two of them sit down and you’re not invited, don’t rush to the phone, don’t run around, don’t shout from outside, don’t try to magnify your own importance in the eyes of those two people or those at home, saying, “Talk to me too, I’m here too…” That makes you look pathetic. Europe has more than 400 million people and a huge economy. I don’t think you can afford to behave like that – and I, for one, never do. So Europe must be respected and have a chance of success, not be weak and pathetic.
Máté Gerhardt: And do you think that chance exists now?
Not at the moment, because European leaders have lost their sense of greatness, their feeling of greatness, their desire for greatness. Europe doesn’t want to be great – it just wants to live well. But if you want to live well, you have to be great and strong. This connection isn’t yet obvious in Brussels.
Máté Gerhardt: The location is a very important question, isn’t it? “Why Alaska, of All Places?” [“Miért éppen Alaszka?”, the Hungarian title for the series “Northern Exposure”] This also has symbolic significance. It’s interesting that they’re not meeting in a neutral location, isn’t it? It’s been many years since they met in America – or since President Biden last held talks with Putin. Why are they going to sit down and talk in Alaska?
György Nógrádi: Thank you very much. Let me make two comments, and then I’ll respond. One: I find it extremely interesting that Merz immediately called Trump to involve himself in preparations for the meeting in Alaska. Trump didn’t consider that necessary. Two: the 27 European countries – 26 to one, because the Hungarian prime minister vetoed it – are unwilling to accept that they’re no longer global players. Perhaps there will be time to talk about the three global players, what the Chinese position is, what the American position is, what the Russian position is; but Europe is not a global player. In the Middle East, they often said, “Give us the money and don’t interfere.” The Prime Minister has said that the most dangerous thing about Europe is that it’s rich and weak. This is an incredibly interesting thing. Once, a German foreign minister said that Europe is a “herbivore”, and called the United States and Russia “Fresser”: “greedy carnivores”. But Europe isn’t. Alaska. Many locations were discussed: Hungary was discussed in theory, as were the Persian Gulf and Arabian Gulf regions, the Vatican, and Switzerland. The United States insisted on Alaska. But Alaska has symbolic significance. Until 1867, it was Russian territory. The Russians sold it, they were in a very bad financial situation at that time – or also at that time, if you like. They were engaged in the fur trade, but it was so expensive to transport the pelts from there to Europe that it wasn’t worth it for them. The American delegation at the time were strongly criticised for paying 7.2 million dollars in gold for what was described as an “icebox”. But it paid off! My final sentence. I’m currently reading Condoleezza Rice’s memoirs, in which she describes how Putin appointed a man to liaise with her, Defence Minister Ivanov. President Bush had appointed her. And she negotiated with Ivanov. And Ivanov said that he’d recently been to Alaska, and that it was like Russian territory. And Condi replied, “It was”. That’s it, that says it all. They’re meeting there, in the largest state in the United States, the second smallest in terms of population, and the smallest in terms of population per square kilometre.
Máté Gerhardt: An interesting question is what has changed in President Trump’s thinking, given that previously is rhetoric related to Putin was very hardline. Earlier he said that he was able to negotiate with him very well. It would be interesting to know what’s changed and why. I don’t think Putin was intimidated, but it seems that realpolitik and the changes on the front lines are clearly influencing Trump’s and Putin’s thinking in completely different ways. What do you think we can expect there in Alaska? What can the parties achieve?
I follow your work and that of the Professor with a great deal of fellow feeling. It can’t be easy for you: it wasn’t always like this, but nowadays whatever people say either reflects reality or it doesn’t. So political communication in the Western world is no longer what it used to be. Communication is about making things a shared experience, isn’t it? I explain matters to you and bring you in, so you understand what politics is really about – because, in the end, the consequences directly affect you. In the past, people talked about politics so that others would understand and get involved. But in recent times, especially in the age of technological gadgets, everything’s changed. So today from politicians’ statements it’s almost impossible to read the situation, the intentions, the goals, and the available tools. This is why I sympathise with the Professor and with you – because obviously you I have no alternative but to read between the lines. I’m fortunate to be sitting there, and I know that what they say in public and what I see are obviously two different things. Nothing has changed there. No matter what they’ve said in the meantime, everyone – including the Russians and the Americans – has had the same goals as they had from the beginning.
Máté Gerhardt: Yes, but what can we expect at the summit? After all, the stakes are war or peace, the continuation of war. This is why President Zelenskyy was left out and not even invited to this summit – and nor was the EU leadership. So it seems that Trump and Putin – and you mentioned this earlier – will reach an agreement with the Ukrainians over their heads.
I’m curious to hear what the Professor has to say. I have my own opinion on this, but I don’t want to pre-empt the Professor.
György Nógrádi: There are several things. One: there are currently three global players: China, the US, and Russia. Two: Trump wants to sit down with Putin. There is one thing to discuss with Zelenskyy: Ukraine, raw materials, strategic products, borders – but that’s Ukraine. Whether you like it or not, with the Russians you have to discuss world affairs. Currently, 50 per cent of the world’s terrorist acts are in the Sahel region: we never talk about it. Libya: there’s a civil war. Gaza: let’s not get into it, we could talk about it for half an hour. The “inner ring” of the Middle East, the situation in Syria, the question of Jordan, the Palestinian refugees, the situation in Lebanon, the Chinese question…
Máté Gerhardt: So in your opinion Ukraine is a secondary issue?
György Nógrádi: A fifth-rate issue. So, whether you like it or not, today Zelenskyy is on the periphery. He finds this extremely difficult to accept. There was once a man named Henry Kissinger. Kissinger said that the fundamental strategic goal of the US was to play the Soviet Union and China off against each other. He did it wonderfully. Then Biden came along. What did he say? “We have two enemies: Russia and China.” Kissinger turned in his grave. Then Trump comes along. What’s his goal? To play the Russians and the Chinese off against each other: the Kissinger strategy. Then along comes Kallas, the Estonian High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who ten days ago met with the Chinese foreign minister and said that she doesn’t understand why China is supporting Russia. She told them not to support it. I thought I’d fall off my chair! I didn’t think a European Union foreign affairs leader could be that stupid. And the Chinese foreign minister told her to try to understand that the West is currently united against Russia, and if they defeat Russia, they’ll turn on China. China’s fundamental national strategy is to support Russia – period. So it’s extremely interesting. One more comment: in terms of nuclear weapons, Russia and the US are roughly on a par with each other – not exactly, but if I look at land-based weapons, etc., they’re on a par with each other. There’s no third force – period.
I…
Gerhardt Máté: Yes?
Having listened to the Professor, I’d like to add an answer to this question – I mean Zelenskyy’s take on this issue, on the fact that he’s lost the war. So now we’re talking as if this were an open-ended military situation, but it isn’t: the Ukrainians have lost this war, Russia has won this war. The only question is when and under what circumstances the West – which is backing the Ukrainians – will acknowledge that this has happened, and what consequences will flow from this. So the Ukrainians – especially the Ukrainian president – are in a very difficult situation. The Professor is right that Europe isn’t a global player, so why would it be at the table? But there’s a bigger problem: it’s not even in control of its own affairs, because the reason that today Ukraine isn’t capitulating is that it’s being supplied with weapons and money by the Europeans – and, as I see it, to an ever lesser extent by the Americans. Without this, the war would have been over long ago. We’ve always said that there’s no need to supply them, and that the Europeans should have sat down and negotiated with the Russians during the Biden administration, before Trump took office – either through European institutions or through the French and Germans. By the way, that’s something we officially proposed. Europe could have kept control of its own future if we Europeans had negotiated with the Russians about the future of Europe. Now the Russians are negotiating with the Americans on a number of issues, as the Professor has said – including the future of Europe. But we’re not negotiating. This is confirmation of the epigram that in negotiations if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.
Máté Gerhardt: Mainly because…
György Nógrádi: Excuse me, sorry…
Máté Gerhardt: Yes?
György Nógrádi: A couple of comments. The Prime Minister is absolutely right. One: In 1991 an independent Ukraine was created with 52 million people. Tell me, where are 30 million of them today? There are only 22–24 million of them! Two: In order to survive, Zelenskyy needs 3 billion dollars a month for his own internal costs, plus weapons for free. Yesterday the US officially announced that there’s no more money: it will provide weapons if Europe pays for them. So Europe has manoeuvred itself into an extremely bad situation, from which it’s difficult to escape. I read the Russian, Ukrainian and European press every day, and on a daily basis Europe announces that Ukraine is protecting Europe. This is simply not true! Every day the most talented Western generals – and I don’t understand them, the French Chief of Staff, the Germans call him the Inspector General, but he’s the Chief of Staff – say that in two or three years Russia will invade Europe. I beg you, NATO’s conventional forces in Europe are four times stronger than the Russians! What fool, excuse me, would attack a force that’s four times as big as he has? So I don’t understand. I understand the objectives of European policy, but what they’re saying is simply untrue.
And in total we – the European Member States – spend more from our budget on weapons, much more, than the Russians; and they number about 140 million people, a bit fewer, while we number more than 400 million…
György Nógrádi: And our GDP is many times theirs…
Military experts or military leaders obviously say what they say because they’re acting on political instructions.
György Nógrádi: Of course!
These are political positions, not professional ones. The same applies to war. Every expert – I mean soldiers, professional soldiers – knows that Ukraine could have won this war if we’d sent not only weapons to the front line, but also a large number of “boots on the ground” as the Americans say: a large number of troops, and if we’d fought there on the front line. That would have been equivalent to a world war, so it was right not to do that. But if you don’t do that, you can’t win the war. There’s another illusion here. I don’t usually reveal – and I’m not revealing now – the content of private or official conversations or telephone calls, but in general I can say that European leaders have a much broader perspective than that of the Russo–Ukrainian war itself. Unfortunately, it’s a false perspective. They think that if they drag out the war, Ukraine will hold out, and the result will be the fall of the regime, the government, and President Putin in Moscow. Therefore many European leaders believe that if the Ukrainians hold out, then regime change in Moscow will eventually be achieved. I consider this to be an illusion. They can’t back it up with any figures or arguments, but it’s an example of wishful thinking. And this is why, instead of negotiating with the Russian president, they declare him an international criminal, treat him like the devil incarnate, and so on and so forth – thereby closing off the path that they themselves should be taking in order to negotiate. And this has led to the situation, as the Professor has said, in which we Europeans have manoeuvred ourselves into a position in which we’re not able to negotiate with the Russians, but the Russians and the Americans are able to do so.
Máté Gerhardt: Yes, so is it possible that decisions about Europe’s future will be made over Europe’s head?
György Nógrádi: Yes, definitely yes – that’s what we’re seeing.
That’s how it usually is.
György Nógrádi: There’s nothing unusual about that. Prime Minister, what you’ve said is completely correct. One or two comments. One: Russia is a nuclear power, Ukraine is not. Two: we should not provoke the Russians. Three: I don’t want to get into the situation of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine right now, but what they’re doing to us is simply despicable.I always say that I’m just a stupid university professor. But I can say that a few days ago they took a church minister to the front, whose child was at home and whose wife was pregnant. They took the husband away, the two children died, and now they’re allowing him to return home for the funeral. There are countless Hungarians fighting on the front lines, which is something we never talk about. Next point: if Europe had actually sent the armies that Zelenskyy expected, it would be called World War III, and the chances of survival would be minimal. So that’s something we need to appreciate. Next point: the Americans conducted a poll on Zelenskyy’s popularity, and it turned out that 7 per cent want him as head of state. Zelenskyy ordered a poll the next day, which came out at 73 per cent. Churchill said that he only believed statistics that he had falsified himself. But it’s clear that in Ukraine those who are able to are fleeing. No matter what happens, Ukraine cannot win this war. This isn’t the place for advertising, and that’s not my intention, but about two weeks ago one of Europe’s best newspapers, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, published an analysis saying that no matter how many weapons we give them, there aren’t enough people in Ukraine to win the war – period.
But there’s another dimension to this. We’re talking about the war now, but if I may, I’d like to refer back to what the Professor said about what’s happening in the rest of the world. We think that everything revolves around the Russo–Ukrainian war. This is understandable, since it’s happening in our neighbourhood and we’re Europeans. But when you talk to leaders from other parts of the world, you’ll see what the Professor said: of course the Russo–Ukrainian war is important, but there are other issues that are more important to them than this. And the world doesn’t really tolerate the fact that instead of helping with conflicts in other parts of the world, the Americans and Westerners have dug themselves into a Russo–Ukrainian war, pushing all other world problems into the background. President Trump is now breaking out of this because he’s methodically addressing the world’s hotspots, flashpoints and trouble spots, and is trying to resolve them one by one. This is why everyone’s happy, regardless of whether or not they sympathise with the American president. But in world politics, everyone outside Europe is happy that finally there’s a man, a serious leader, a serious man – regardless of what they think of him politically and his style – with serious power and strength, trying to resolve unresolved issues. What I want to say is that the Russo–Ukrainian war is important, but behind it – and perhaps behind or above all other conflicts – there’s another big question: whether the conflicts will result in a unified global economy, a whole, a new system of cooperation based on new power relations, or whether the global economy will be split in two, with the formation of blocs. This will determine – or will have a major impact on – the economic development of Hungary, for example. So while we’re talking about the war, behind the whole war scene lies the question of the future of the global economy, which right now is in need of restructuring.
György Nógrádi: Two comments. One: there are very serious debates in the world about how many wars are currently going on. Their number is estimated to be between 40 and 100 – but from our point of view that doesn’t matter. The world’s attention, however, is constantly fixed on three wars: Gaza, Russia–Ukraine and Taiwan. Before you correct me, there’s no war in Taiwan yet. Two: if anyone takes the trouble to read the latest BRICS resolution, the BRICS countries have protested at Ukraine’s attacks on Russian territory. From a European perspective this is incomprehensible! From their point of view, it’s logical. So we’ve got really bogged down in the fact that, my God, there’s a war in Europe; but the world looks at it differently.
Gerhardt Máté: Yes, it’s also clear that this tit-for-tar, bargaining and haggling could shape the future of the European energy market – and, as you mentioned, it could divide the world market or bring it closer together. So, if I’ve understood correctly, Putin and Trump are thinking in dimensions that are completely different from what will happen now with the war in Ukraine. In this it seems that Zelenskyy no longer has a say, and EU leaders cannot intervene. Are the leaders of the two world powers really deciding this for us?
It’s not unprecedented for there to be the illusion that one topic dominates everything. Understandably, as I’ve said, the Russo–Ukrainian war, territory, concessions: that’s what we’re talking about. But in fact there will also be issues of equal – or perhaps greater – importance on the table, but today no one’s talking about them. We really need to clarify the global energy trading situation, which leads us to the question of what will happen with the sanctions. Will one or two players continue to be excluded from global energy management, leading to backdoor solutions such as Russian oil shipments to India, which will trigger further sanctions? You understand what I’m talking about. Or will we abandon the sanctions policy in one or more steps, and say that now there will not be two global economies, but one, while we agree on the most important issues? This is the case with global energy supply, including the issue of Europe and the sanctions imposed by Europe on Russia. Hungary’s fate depends on these issues. How much, in what quantity and at what price can we buy energy on the world market? This too may be decided here and now. And then I can even ask questions such as these: What about investments? Can Russians invest in America? Can Americans invest in Russia? In which sectors? How, and how much? So, beyond the war, also on the table are big questions about the restructuring of the global economy. I don’t want to slip into the role of speculating about what will be discussed; but believe me, when I talk to either of them, we always discuss these issues – even though Hungary’s importance is not comparable to our other negotiating party. But because they’re important issues they even talk to us about them.
György Nógrádi: It follows from this that we’ll see what kind of document comes out after the Alaska talks. There will be a lot of things missing from the joint statement, because that’s not the goal. On what the Prime Minister said. One: Nord Stream 1 and 2 was blown up. Polish foreign minister Sikorski wrote on his Facebook page: “Thank you, USA”. The scandal was huge, and a few hours later he had to delete it. Second comment: there’s still one more question. What will happen to Ukraine’s western borders after the war? I always say that I’m just a stupid university professor. What will Ukrainian–Polish relations be like in a situation where there’s a new Polish head of state who takes a hardline stance on Ukraine’s role in World War II? What will relations with Romanian be like? After all, Romania has always metaphorically given Moldova the eye and winked at it, thinking of its strategic goals with that country. So Ukraine’s situation is extremely difficult, and Zelenskyy’s prospects are getting worse by the day. Excuse me. To put it simply, the two organisations that investigate corruption were subordinated to him, then there was a huge scandal, and the same parliament decreed that the two organisations would remain independent. In Ukrainian domestic politics there are two people who are much more popular than he is: the head of the military secret service and the former commander-in-chief of the army, who’s now the ambassador to London. How can he prevent them from running in the elections? How can he manage to win another election?
Máté Gerhardt: He can prevent that with the war. As long as there’s war, he is the Ukrainian president.
György Nógrádi: Yes, but sooner or later the war will end.
Or rather, as long as those who pay them are willing to tolerate it. Because if those who pay them say that it’s time for elections, then that’s it.
György Nógrádi: And that’s why German and Anglo-Saxon interests seem to be different when it comes to Ukraine’s future, don’t they?
Máté Gerhardt: Yes, let’s talk about the western borders, Ukraine’s western borders. The eastern border is a completely different topic, but what will happen to the western border, and what will be the role of the Ukrainians? Those who have already declared themselves to be Europe’s peacekeepers or army, saying that they’ll defend peace: there’s been talk about them stepping in if the Americans withdraw.
If the Professor will allow me to answer first, and if you’ll allow me to start a little further back, then I’d say that in order to fully understand the context of this question we must first face the not very pleasant but real fact that world politics and its changes shouldn’t be viewed as being on the axis of good–bad, right–wrong. This is how you tend to view it when you write about it, but that’s your job. I don’t want to pick on you, I just want to say that, of course, journalists write that this is good, that is bad, this is right, that is wrong. Okay, my profession isn’t journalism, it’s a different profession. I see that the axis of world politics is the power equilibrium. If there’s a power equilibrium forming the basis for the functioning of the global economy, and this isn’t disrupted, then the global economy will tick along, for better or worse – but there will be no dramatic moments. If any significant element in the power equilibrium changes because one of the players changes, the other will react and everything will be upset. This is what happened with the Russo–Ukrainian war. What happened was that the Ukrainians announced that they were moving from their previous role as a buffer zone and buffer state to that of a Western ally. The question now is not whether this is good or right, whether they have the right to do so or not. Of course those are intriguing questions, but the fact is that this immediately resulted in a change in the power equilibrium. The Russians said that along a very long border they didn’t want to have a neighbour that was part of the Western alliance system, that had Western weapons, that maintained a large army, and that would eventually join NATO. And they said, “If you don’t understand this, we’ll take steps to ensure that it doesn’t happen.” And that’s why everything was turned upside down. Ukraine thought it would change its house number, as we say. The Ukrainian house number says that it’s a buffer state between East and West. We used to be in this situation too. So I understand the Ukrainians emotionally, and I see how their history weighs on them. We were like that between 1990 and 1999, when for nine years we were a buffer state. We left the Warsaw Pact, but we weren’t members of NATO, which we joined in 1999. But there was a buffer zone moment. After we joined NATO, the Ukrainians found themselves in the role of a buffer state. And the European power equilibrium depended on the fact that Ukraine was a buffer state: it had influence from the West, and it had influence from the East – from the Russians. This led to conflict over how much influence each side should have, which government was closer to whom – I could list Yanukovych and Yushchenko, I could give examples from here and there. But the point is that everyone still viewed Ukraine as a buffer state. Now, in contrast to this, the Ukrainians have announced that they no longer want this fate. They had the right to do so, and they said “No, we’ll be part of Western integration.” This disrupted the power equilibrium, the Russians are reacting to this, and now a new equilibrium must be found. And in this game, with Ukraine’s decision not to be a buffer state, Ukraine’s statehood has been put at risk. We’re talking about where a country’s borders are, the eastern and western ones. So I understand why the Ukrainians made the decision they did, why they chose what they did with this move, which they could have won. They surely had a plan in mind, but I don’t think it was very realistic. Today they’re losing, and the very existence of their state is at stake. The West is trying to save what can be saved, saying that at least the remaining part of Ukraine should be part of Western structures. The Russians may or may not accept this, the Americans may or may not give their blessing, but one thing is certain: Ukraine will not decide its own future, because it broke the power equilibrium and caused this situation, putting its own statehood at risk. This is how I view this three-year war from my position as, let’s say, a semi-observer and semi-participant.
György Nógrádi: I’ve written down a few things in a few sentences. One: there are currently 151,000 Ukrainians of military age in Germany, who are being supported by the Germans. The biggest domestic political storm in Germany in the past week was about why they should give these people so-called “Bürgergeld”: basic income support, which costs a horrendous amount of money. It’s said that they should either go out to work or go home. An entire presentation could be given on this. Second: politics. An ideological form of politics has emerged in Europe. Only in Europe. The rest of the world has been laughing at us, because out there interest-based politics prevails. The best example of this is Annalena Baerbock, who said she would pursue feminist foreign policy. I don’t want to go into it, I could talk for hours about her nonsense. The next comment is that Zelenskyy broadcasts his words of wisdom every day. They’re astonishing! I feel that now this is counterproductive. I have two more comments. There were four neutral countries in Europe, two of which have joined NATO: Sweden and Finland. This has increased the common border between NATO and Russia by a thousand kilometres or so. The Austrians have refused to join NATO despite American pressure, and the Swiss have also held out. And my last comment is that on 12 March 1999, three countries joined NATO: the Czechs, the Poles, and us. There were huge debates, the Prime Minister saw this from the inside, and I saw it from the outside. There were two countries that wanted to take in five countries, with France being the most influential one. They were swept aside. The American view prevailed: three countries.
I signed the accession document. That was a really long time ago.
Máté Gerhardt: And the biggest issue now is ideology-based politics: if we look at how Putin does politics and how Trump does politics, and then the EU, with their ideology-based approach, with this do-goodery, if I can put it that way. They support the war in Ukraine, even though it’s already clear that it’s a losing position. Why do they stick to that line?
You mean the Europeans?
Máté Gerhardt: Yes.
I gave a speech in which I tried to provide some perspectives on this, because it’s very difficult to say that it’s for this or that reason. But there are perspectives that we can identify. Because it’s often the case that many people support something, and when you break it down, you see that not everyone supported that particular thing for the same reason. So here, too, we have to be careful with our wording. There are some thirty-odd thousand bureaucrats in Brussels, and there’s an idea over there that the European Union should be transformed from a Europe of nations into a United States of Europe, so to speak. To do this, they need to take as many powers as possible away from the nations, from the nation states. This is what’s happening, and I’m fighting against it: Hungary is fighting against it every day. And I see that whatever crisis arises, such as this war crisis, the powerful centre in Brussels – which wields decisive influence in Europe – uses every crisis to take power away from the Member States and move forward on its own path towards building a federal United States of Europe, an empire. This was the case with the financial crisis in 2008–09, then with the migration crisis, then with COVID, and now it’s the same with the war. The longer the war lasts, the more powers the Brussels bureaucrats will take away from the Member States. In fact, a decisive step on the road to a United States of Europe is collective debt, which we oppose because collective debt will later lead to a collective state – as was the case with the birth of the United States. The longer the war drags on, the more money will have to be given to Ukraine. We oppose this, but the majority doesn’t: apart from us, and apart from the Slovaks, almost no one else does. How can the war be financed? Through loans! Loans must be taken out. They all want this. So there’s a Brussels empire-building scenario, into which this war fits nicely.
Gerhardt Máté: Yes, and it also seems as if they want to compensate Ukraine by letting it join the EU. So they’re tempting them with the promise that somehow they’ll survive the war, come what may, but the most important thing is that then they’ll gain EU membership. That was one of the points made in the European Council decision, wasn’t it? What do you think about that?
György Nógrádi: I have two comments. One: the Russians have made it clear that Ukraine cannot become a member of NATO. They’ve made many other things clear as well: no nuclear weapons, etc. But the Russians have never objected to Ukraine joining the EU.
On the contrary!
György Nógrádi: Because they believe that if Ukraine joins the EU, it will destroy it from within.
That’s right! That’s right!
György Nógrádi: We never say this out loud. Two: there are countries in the EU that instinctively hate the Russians, but we don’t dare say that either. The Baltic states, where for centuries those three countries somehow found themselves between the Germans and the Russians. But today, all three have Russian minorities that are ruthlessly oppressed. This gives Russian politics enormous room for manoeuvre, which today they’re unwilling to use or don’t want to use. Then we have Polish politics with its traditional anti-Russian sentiment. During World War II, Polish politicians used to say that to the Germans they could lose their independence, but to the Russians they could lose their immortal souls. The Polish–Russian antagonism is astonishing. The question of borders. Earlier you asked what will happen with the borders. What does Churchill say after World War II? Germany makes a left turn and takes three steps forward. In other words, the Poles got to the Oder–Neisse line, which would become the German–Polish border – as it is today; and the Soviet Union would get the huge pseudo-Polish territories, which are now Ukrainian land. What has the Polish leadership said? That it doesn’t claim a single square centimetre of territory, but that after the war those territories will be integrated into the Polish national economy. I cannot interpret this politically, legally, or in terms of security policy.
Yes. I can only comment from a Hungarian perspective. I agree with all the difficulties that the Professor has described here. You can see that for a country like Hungary it’s not so easy to untangle the threads and follow a sensible foreign policy line. In order to be able to follow a logical path, we need to identify our interests and not stray from that path. I can say that it’s in Hungary’s interest that we never, under any circumstances, integrate with Ukraine: not in NATO, not in the European Union, not in anything. If we integrate with the Ukrainians, there will be unforeseeable consequences – or very foreseeable ones. The first is that all our money will go there. So if Ukraine is admitted to the European Union, that will be a direct path to Hungary’s impoverishment. Our agricultural economy will be ruined, we’ll lose jobs, and many other things will happen. This must be avoided at all costs. At the same time, we cannot be heartless or irrational, and we cannot tell the Ukrainians to float in space. So we have to do something with them: we have to tie them down or anchor them, we have to help them with that. And I think we need to form a strategic alliance with them: the European Union needs to form a strategic alliance with Ukraine, based on a treaty, that can be amended. But we should never grant membership. Once you’re accepted somewhere, you can never be expelled, you can never be got rid of. This is why Ukraine should never be allowed to join an integration that includes Hungary, because within an integration there could be conflicts of interest between Ukraine and Hungary whereby we’d always lose out: they are big, we are small; their territory is huge, ours is smaller. So we have to be sensible: it’s clearly in Hungary’s interest to oppose Ukrainian EU membership.
Máté Gerhardt: Yes, that’s what was represented in Voks2025.
György Nógrádi: One comment.
Máté Gerhardt: Yes?
György Nógrádi: I apologise. One: what the Prime Minister said about Hungary is perfectly true, but it’s also true for French farmers. If Ukraine joins the EU, French agriculture won’t receive the enormous amount of money it’s been receiving from Brussels. If this happens in France, the Government there will fall. Therefore, it’s in France’s fundamental national interest that Ukraine not be admitted to the EU.
Gerhardt Máté: But only France?
György Nógrádi: No.
Máté Gerhardt: Germany, Italy? No?
György Nógrádi: Agriculture plays a much stronger role in Germany. My second comment is that there was a Hungarian prime minister…
And it’s true for the Italians.
György Nógrádi: Yes.
Máté Gerhardt: Of course, it’s the same there, yes…
György Nógrádi: And for quite a few southern European countries. There was a prime minister named József Antall. He wanted to form a strategic alliance with the Ukrainians to counterbalance a potential future Little Entente. And during his roughly three years as prime minister, he realised that it was impossible to form that strategic alliance with the Ukrainians.
Máté Gerhardt: But coming back to what you mentioned, that the Russians know, or say, that the Ukrainians would destroy the Union from within, how can we picture the destruction that the Professor mentioned – in financial, political and societal terms?
We must start from the premise that today the European Union is an economic integration in mortal danger. In other words, we’ve lost our competitiveness. Maintaining the welfare state seems almost impossible. There are cost-of-living problems. Internal social tensions are rattling and shaking the institutional framework of democracy – and now we’re talking about democracy, not governance. The question is whether a democratic system of government can respond to the challenges facing Europe. But that’s a far-reaching discussion. I just want to say that we’re facing enormous challenges. We must focus all our energies on ourselves. We don’t have the money to finance a country that once had a population of 50 million, that now has a population of twenty-odd million, or who knows exactly how many – a country which is at war and which imagines its future as us financing a million-strong army with European money. We cannot take on such a country – it would crush us. We have to spend all our money on our own competitiveness, modernisation, and maintenance of the middle class – otherwise the entire European democratic system will collapse. That is the task at hand. Ukraine does not fit into this.
György Nógrádi: I have three comments. One: the predecessor of the European Union, under the Treaty of Rome, was established in the spring of 1957 by six countries – but only for economic purposes, nothing else. It worked well for six countries, but it works very strangely for 27 countries. Two: there’s the question of the Balkans: the Balkan states should be included. Let’s leave Serbian and other politics aside for now – we can come back to that later. But it’s turned out that it’s much easier to include these countries in NATO than in the European Union, because the whole system is completely different. And one last comment. The Ukrainian army was mentioned. One of my favourite quotes is from a Ukrainian military commander who said that if Hungary gets too clever, it will take two hours for his tanks to get from Záhony to Lake Balaton. I said that I have a Mercedes, I can’t cover 400 kilometres in two hours, and added, “Come alone, take a swim, you don’t need tanks.” But this is part of the Ukrainian mindset today.
Máté Gerhardt: Yes, but this is a weak and rich Europe that cannot defend itself. How did we get here? How did we get to the point where Europe, which was a self-reliant and incredibly prosperous continent, has ended up here?
György Nógrádi: If we have three hours, I’ll tell you, but I’ll try.
Máté Gerhardt: Yes, let’s shorten it then. This is perhaps the most important thing…
György Nógrádi: How did Europe enter the 20th century? There were three dominant powers: the US, Germany and Great Britain. How did Europe leave the 20th century? There is no European power. There was a German chancellor named Helmut Schmidt, whom I liked very much, and who said that “Germany is too big for Europe and too small for the world.” There is no European power. Merkel has historical merits and historical sins, and perhaps one day we’ll have the opportunity to talk about that, but in practice Europe was led by three countries: the British, who left, see Brexit; the French, where there’s an extremely strange situation, with presidential control and three major parties; and Germany, where the three-party coalition failed. In German history there was one time when a party won an absolute majority: in 1957 with Adenauer. But never again. Now there’s a two-party coalition, where the Social Democrats are getting weaker by the day, and we see the problems every day. So Europe really is in mortal danger.
I also have an answer to the question of how we got here. After World War II we lost control of our own continent. World War II wasn’t settled by Europeans, but by Americans and Russians, over our heads. So after World War II we lived in a way in which Europe was unable to influence its own destiny, because the western half was occupied by the Americans and the eastern half by the Russians – or the Soviet Union. And this became the new Europe. And what was NATO’s motto at the time? Very instructive: “Keep the Americans in, keep the Russians out, and keep the Germans down.” That was the definition of NATO. The Germans had to be kept down so that a European power would not emerge. Well, this worked well for a while, because the United States not only ensured Europe’s security – including against Russia – with its military power, but also financed it: the United States spent proportionally much more of its own budget on military expenditure – including on the defence of Europe – than we Europeans did. Since we didn’t spend money on our armed forces, we were able to spend it on other things. This was called the “peace dividend”: if you don’t have to maintain an army, you can spend that money on the welfare state, on this and that. This worked well for a while, but after the world changed, American competitiveness began to lose momentum, and the Americans decided that they were no longer willing to defend Europe for free while Europeans spent this peace dividend on welfare spending. They said, “Guys, you should pitch in too.” So the force driving the current situation is that the Americans have started to lose their competitiveness globally, mainly due to the rise of Asia. They need money at home: they can’t afford to be present in the South China region, in the Middle East, and at the same time to even protect Europe for free. It’s not feasible! That’s why they say, why President Trump says, “Guys, there’s a new situation, pay up!” That’s how we got here.
György Nógrádi: Two comments. One: every US ambassador to Germany over the past fifteen years has said, “Please spend more on defence.” Today Germany is better off than the US because Germany spends little on defence. Two: I know there’s no time to go into history. There was once a man named Winston Churchill, whose desire in both world wars was to involve the Russians, the Turks, etc. So Churchill’s basic concept was to land in Yugoslavia, on the Ljubljana–Vienna line, to prevent the Soviets from entering Germany. Eisenhower thought he was crazy. Roosevelt treated him dismissively. So it’s incredibly interesting how much the situation today reflects that after World War II.
Máté Gerhardt: Yes, while the money ran out, the weapons ran out in Europe, and now the European Union leadership can only shout from the sidelines about what it wants to achieve. Trump and Putin may listen to this out of politeness, right? Trump said he would listen to everyone’s opinion; but what will come of it is another question. What do you think will come of it?
Before we get there, Europeans need to decide what they want to be. In other words, they need to redefine their place in the world. They’re not doing this. This also has consequences for Hungary, because there’s no European self-definition to which we can adapt ourselves. This is why, since the time of the financial crisis, which coincided with Fidesz forming its first government in 2010, we’ve had to develop our own national strategy, in the absence of a European strategy and with Europe visibly weakening and losing ground. Because if we’d aligned ourselves with the Europeans, we’d be up to our necks in a war with Russia, the green transition would have ruined the Hungarian economy, we’d be on bad terms with the Americans, and we’d have no Chinese investments. So if we’d gone along with the Europeans, today the entire Hungarian economy would be on its knees. So we cannot afford to do that. I’m only saying this because it would be in our interest to have a European strategy in which we recognise the potential of Hungarian interests and work together with them. But there’s no such thing today! It could be possible if the French and Germans were strong enough at home to jointly develop a vision in which we could all find our place. Then Europe would have a grand strategy. But it has neither a grand strategy nor a small one, which is why they’re issuing statements on the sidelines of a Trump–Putin meeting. This is where we are at the moment. But I don’t want to complain: we have to accept that this is the situation. We’re Hungarians, we don’t want to go down with the Europeans, because they’re heading in that direction – whether it be on migration, war or competitiveness. And we’re pursuing our own national strategy, hoping that there will be an increasing number of people in Europe who will follow their own national strategies. And then we’ll redefine the common interests of the European Union – because the current one, controlled from Brussels, has fallen apart.
György Nógrádi: I have two comments. One: it’s extremely interesting to look at Merz’s daily politics: he’s suffering. His own party is attacking him on a million issues, such as arms deliveries to Israel, yes or no. Two: when I look at the leadership of the European Union, it’s deplorable. When I look at the previous leadership, at least it made sense – despite the alcoholism. So it’s a very, very difficult question: Who’s leading Brussels, and are they capable of leading Europe? Unfortunately, they’re not capable.
Let me say one thing. Of course this may sound like I’m blowing my own trumpet, but this is how it is: Hungary’s greatest strategic advantage, its greatest competitive advantage in the economy, is its stability and the fact that it doesn’t have a coalition government. Now imagine if we had to answer the question of managing the Hungarian economy in the same way as the Germans, who have to strike some kind of compromise between coalition parties with completely different principles. Nothing would come of it. Hungary would be ruined. So it’s vital for us to have a government that’s much more stable, much more capable of action, much more decisive and much more capable of acting than the current European average – otherwise we too will sink into this European decline, which we must stay out of.
György Nógrádi: Excuse me! For days now, one of the topics of debate in Germany has been who will be appointed to the Constitutional Court. The Social Democrats can nominate someone. They nominated a woman, but the CDU/CSU said she was too liberal. It turned out she wasn’t. Then they said she’d written her thesis together with her husband. It turned out that there was a five-year difference between them. But they vetoed her. So it’s clear that a coalition government is a very difficult thing.
That’s another conversation, but maybe one day we can have the intellectual courage – and it’s not that easy – to talk about what the future of European democracy is. Because the Greeks didn’t say what we’re saying now. The Greeks always said that democracy means two things. The first, which we also say today, is participation. Those who pay taxes should be involved – and even more than that: everyone – as many people as possible – should be involved in joint decision-making. But the second thing the Greeks said is that this will only lead to democracy if it results in good governance – otherwise it will lead to anarchy. And today the problem is that in Europe there’s no good governance – there’s democratic participation, and democratic participation is increasingly heading towards anarchy. So we – and the intellectuals, professors and journalists – need to ask ourselves honestly how we can save European democracy. Because now it’s not Ukraine that’s on the table, but rather the question of whether Europe, with its democratic governments, can keep pace with developments in the rest of the world. There are huge issues on the table. Sorry for straying from the topic of our conversation.
György Nógrádi: One sentence. What will happen to Europe’s three major powers, the British, the French and the Germans? We could talk about any of them. It’s clear that there’s a fundamental structural change in Britain, that cooperation between the three parties and the head of state in France is more than problematic, and that Germany has had a new government for a few months and has a lot of problems.
Máté Gerhardt: Prime Minister, you mentioned Hungarian interests. It’s very important to talk about the Hungarians in Transcarpathia and about Ukraine’s position on this issue. We’ve discussed this many times, but what diplomatic, economic, and political tools does the Government have at its disposal to somehow protect our Hungarian compatriots, given that terrible things are happening to them in Ukraine?
We’re using all the tools at our disposal, but the situation is truly worrying, because in a country at war, the possibilities for international legal action are limited: the Ukrainians say, “We’re fighting a life-and-death battle, we understand your problems, but they’re secondary.” So in such cases it’s difficult for minority communities to fight for their rights. What could bring about change is if there’s peace and the major powers decide what Ukraine’s role will be: Will it belong to the East, will it belong to the West, will it become a buffer state, a buffer zone? We don’t know, we’ll have to wait and see. And once the situation has been stabilised militarily, then we can talk about what conditions should prevail within the country once it’s been provided security, and who’s responsible for ensuring that minorities receive all the rights to which they’re entitled within European culture. Therefore peace will also bring us closer to a situation in which we can protect the rights of the Hungarian community living there.
György Nógrádi: Two comments. One: we must recognise that at the moment the European Union doesn’t dare to take on this conflict. Everyone can see that corruption in Ukraine is enormous. They stole 100 billion dollars that was sent there. We see that some of the weapons sent there appear on the black market within moments. When I said this I was criticised, but today the American government is saying the same thing – and since then the criticism of me on this issue has at least decreased. Two: the proportion of Hungarians in Transcarpathia has roughly halved. There are countless refugees, countless dead, and countless people relocating there. Two things must be noted. One: the Ukrainians arriving there are saying to the Hungarians, “Okay, you’re here, but why do you speak Hungarian?” Two: we never talk about this, but there are ever more people in Hungary who cannot enter Ukraine. They’re on a Ukrainian list, and if they did enter, they’d either be immediately deported or imprisoned. So, in plain language, everything that Europe has ever proclaimed as law, justice, and so on, isn’t operating. And the Ukrainian response to this is “We’re at war.”
Máté Gerhardt: Yes, if we’re talking about the Ukrainian response, on the one hand, Hungary has carried out its largest humanitarian aid operation in relation to Ukraine – I’m thinking of electricity and natural gas supplies. Many people say that gratitude isn’t a political tool, not a political concept or category. But meanwhile the Zelenskyy government has launched secret service operations against Hungary. In such circumstances and in this form, how can we strive for normal, balanced – as balanced as possible – relations in these matters?
The Ukrainians have launched major secret service operations against Hungary, most of which are covert, but some of which have been made public; and through their various agents they’ve infiltrated Hungarian politics, Hungarian public opinion and Hungarian institutions to a significant extent. This is a serious problem, one that I battle with every day, and the National Security Advisor and security services report on it regularly. We need to deal with this. But we’re talking about a country at war, so we mustn’t lose our composure. Of course, we’re Ukraine’s backyard, they want to know what’s going on here, they want to influence Hungary’s position – and we don’t want to allow that. In the world of politics this isn’t unusual. At the same time, it’s not in our interest for Ukraine to collapse. We could bring about the collapse of Ukraine in a single day – in a single day. But it’s not in our interest. This is because Ukraine receives a significant portion of its electricity and gas from Hungary. If there were to be an accident and a few pylons were knocked down and a couple of cables were broken, Ukraine would come to a standstill. So while the Ukrainians are talking to us the way they do, disrespectfully and in a way that decent people don’t, at the same time they’re at our mercy. And they know full well that it’s not in our interest to destroy Ukraine or undermine their security, because a collapsing Ukraine on Hungary’s border would pose a threat and a risk to public safety, in terms of terrorism and dangers to the Hungarian minority living there. That’s a risk which Hungary doesn’t want to accept. So the reason they’re so brazen with us is because, while in a sense we have their fate in our hands, they know that – even if it doesn’t support Ukraine’s EU membership – Hungary has no interest in destabilising Ukraine. We need a stable, functioning Ukraine, and they’re taking advantage of this situation. But that’s politics for you.
György Nógrádi: And their fundamental goal is to influence next year’s election in Hungary.
They make no secret of that: they’ve announced it, and so we know that bringing the Hungarian opposition to power is one of Ukrainian foreign policy’s most important priorities – or perhaps even the most important one. That’s life!
Máté Gerhardt: Gentlemen, thank you very much for this discussion. We’ll continue with what we’ve talked about, as there are still many topics worth discussing. I’m delighted that you were with us here in the studio. This was Patrióta Extra. Thank you very much for your attention, and don’t forget to subscribe to the channel, as we’ll be returning with more videos and material analysing world affairs. Thank you for your attention. Bye for now!
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