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Zsolt Törőcsik: Yesterday white smoke rose from the Sistine Chapel, and a little over an hour later Leo XIV, the first North American pope, stepped out to address the faithful. In his first address he spoke of peace, and of the Church building bridges and standing by the poor. I welcome Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to the studio. Good morning.
Good morning.
On Facebook yesterday you wrote that we have a pope, and there is hope. What do you expect from the new pope in terms of Christian affairs and foreign policy?
I follow Vatican developments for two reasons. Firstly, the Vatican is a state, and is part of the international diplomatic scene. It’s a strange state because it’s not run by a chancellor, although there is also a “chancellor” but it’s run by a man of God. So it’s a special state, and the messages that come from it deserve at least twice as much attention. Secondly, as a man of faith, I also pay attention, because man needs spiritual guidance and support. I don’t think that the Pope is North American, but that’s something that the analysts will demonstrate. Because although he was born in Chicago, if I’ve understood correctly he’s from Peru – and in that sense he’ll probably continue what Pope Francis started. So if I had to say something quickly, I’d say that I don’t expect big changes. Perhaps a more important question is why the Holy Father is so important to us – not so much the person, who’s also very important, but that there should be a Holy Father for the world. Hungary is a country in which on the one hand there are Catholics, and then there are members of the Reformed Church. I think that all of us need some kind of spiritual leader within our own church. The modern world tries to replace this with psychologists, but what we really need is not to be treated, but to have a spiritual leader. And Catholics certainly see the Holy Father in that way. But for members of the Reformed Church it’s also relevant who the Pope is, what the Pope says, what messages he sends, what doctrines he affirms; because we need a moral and religious reference point in the world – in a world in turmoil, where Christian values are under constant attack. So I think that Calvinist brothers and sisters also need someone to listen to, to relate to: someone who, I repeat, is a kind of reference point for all Christians in terms of morality and faith. I hope that this will continue to be the case.
Well, we’ll see, we’ll find out in the coming weeks and months. What is certain, however, is that Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, spoke in the European Parliament this week and said that Ukraine’s accession to the European Union must be accelerated, because that’s the strongest guarantee of security. And she also said that they’re working on opening all the accession chapters this year. How realistic do you think it is that this will actually happen this year?
The political decision has been taken. The decision has been taken in spite of Hungary, because we don’t support Ukraine’s accession, and we certainly don’t support fast-track accession. Indeed, two important speeches were made in the European Parliament: from the European People’s Party, and from Mrs. von der Leyen. In response to this speech Robert Fico said that what we heard there was economic suicide. So the admission of Ukraine to the Union is economic suicide. I’m glad that it’s not only Hungary that sees it this way, and now there are other such European leaders as well. Our hopes have been pinned on opposite processes. Now the European leaders – the People’s Party in particular, because it’s the leading force there – have decided that the war must continue, the sanctions must be maintained, Russian energy must be completely squeezed out of Europe, and then as far as the European economy’s concerned, what will be will be. Our hope has been in the opposite direction. We’re hoping, we’re working – not only hoping, but working – for peace. If there’s peace, sanctions can finally be thrown out. If we get rid of the sanctions, energy will be cheaper, and if energy’s cheaper, the economy will be boosted and it will be easier for families. Unfortunately, the Union has decided – and this has now been confirmed – that they’ll be going in the opposite direction. This heightens the internal political debate in Hungary, because in Hungary there are two kinds of political party: there are those sitting in the European Parliament – such as DK [Democratic Coalition] and the Tisza Party – who are following the decision of the European leaders, von der Leyen and the European People’s Party; and there are those of us who stand on national foundations and who contradict it.
We’ll talk about domestic politics in a moment…
To be precise: we don’t contradict it, but speak out against it.
Yes, we’ll also talk about the domestic political aspects, but indeed von der Leyen also mentioned the need to stop imports of Russian energy completely, as a means of achieving Ukraine’s accession. How would this affect energy prices in Europe and in Hungary, and how would it affect the reductions in household energy bills in general? There are calculations on this.
We’re talking about the fact that, after making a huge effort, Hungary has managed to reach a position in which, despite the sanctions against Russian energy, it’s paying the cheapest, second cheapest or third cheapest energy prices in Europe – certainly as far as families are concerned. This is true for gas and also for electricity. So today Hungarian families have access to energy at an unprecedentedly low price; and so their utility bills, although not low, are far lower than those in other countries. As I often say, energy used in a Kádár Cube costs around 260,000 to 280,000 forints over a heating season, while in Slovakia it costs around 480,000, and in Poland around 880,000 to 900,000. Now, about the price of energy being raised. A ban on Russian energy, gas and oil coming into Europe will mean that the price will rise. Hungary’s been getting its energy cheaper from Russia, but if we’re banned from doing this – they’ve announced this, and let’s put aside whether it’s right, whether they have the right, but they certainly intend to do it – then Hungary will have to pay around 800 billion forints more for the energy it buys, for the energy it buys from abroad. We quantified this at the government meeting, and the calculations range from 600 billion euros to 800 billion euros. And this is linked to the reductions in household energy bills in the sense that it’s roughly the amount that we’re spending today to support families by keeping energy prices low. So here, if Brussels can push this through, in no time at all families will be paying twice as much for gas and electricity as they did before. This is what’s being decided today in Brussels. For some mysterious reason this is supported by the Hungarian parties DK and the Tisza Party – it’s supported by the parties in Brussels that come from Hungary. We can count on Mi Hazánk [Our Homeland], Fidesz and the KDNP, who don’t belong to the governing European parties, but belong to the European opposition. We’re resisting it, we didn’t vote for it and we shall not support it.
At the same time, they’re saying that they’ll adopt this plan with a qualified majority if needed, against Hungary’s will. What can be done to prevent this, and how can even the current consultative referendum help?
I can see that in the coming weeks and months Hungary – and I personally in Brussels – will have to fight hard to ensure that Hungarian households aren’t forced to pay twice as much for their energy. We need to gather allies and we need to prepare ourselves legally. And there is indeed a plan to circumvent the system of unanimous decision-making that’s been in place up to now, and to bypass it so that the decision can be made by a qualified majority. For this fight I need strength and help. Voks2025, which is about Ukraine’s accession, is directly linked to energy prices and the reductions in household energy bills. So I ask everyone who wants to help the Government – and me – to fight well in Brussels in defending low household energy bills to do so by voting in Voks2025.
You’ve mentioned that, if we look at the Hungarian domestic political fault lines, on this issue Fidesz is on one side and DK and Tisza are on the other side. At the same time, this week the President of the Tisza Party wrote an open letter to the President of the European People’s Party, stating that “TISZA does not agree with Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the European Union”. What makes you think the opposite?
Well, mostly because the same party leader also said that he’d never go to Brussels as an MEP. He also said that he’d abolish the institution of parliamentary immunity. By contrast, he’s sitting in Brussels, opposing the waiving of parliamentary immunity for crimes committed in Hungary, using immunity and hiding behind it to continue his political activities. So it’s difficult to take someone’s opinion seriously if they’ve previously compromised their credibility. This is why I consider such things to be play-acting. I know the European People’s Party from the inside: the Tisza Party can tell me whatever it wants, but we were members of the European People’s Party for many years, having been invited in by Helmut Kohl in the late 1990s and early 2000s. I know everyone, from all sides, thoroughly, inside out, everyone. I know how it works. In the European People’s Party there’s no getting round that. That’s why we left it. So we left the EPP because they wanted to impose on us the German – or Brussels – position on migration. So anyone who’s in the European People’s Party has to accept what the European People’s Party says. It’s a disciplined party: if you don’t fall in line, you won’t get your share of the pie. What’s more, the European People’s Party has announced that it wants a change of government in Hungary, and that it will help a government into power in Hungary that will abide by the policies of Brussels and the European People’s Party. Today this means supporting the war, admitting Ukraine, accepting migration and accepting the position of the European mainstream on gender. Those who are in the People’s Party represent this – whatever they say, whatever they write, whatever they claim.
The other Hungarian party supporting Ukraine is the Democratic Coalition, whose current president, Ferenc Gyurcsány, yesterday announced that he’s withdrawing from Hungarian public life. What do you think about his departure, and how might the policies of the Democratic Coalition change, if at all?
It’s not the done thing to occupy oneself with the business of others, and it’s better to stick to keeping one’s own house in order. But perhaps I can allow myself two comments. The first is that DK is in a fight to the death with Tisza. But not with the Government! The DK–Government match is over, with the voters having already decided on that four or five times. Here the fight is really for opposition leadership and survival. What we’re witnessing is a Tisza–DK match, and obviously DK thought that this is how they’d have a better chance. It’s their party, it’s their decision, it’s their soul, and I don’t want to judge it. But the matter is mixed up with the fact that Ferenc Gyurcsány has also divorced Klára Dobrev, who’s the new leader of DK. I can only say that I feel for them: after many years of marriage it can’t be easy to decide to continue one’s life separately from one’s former spouse. This is a private matter, and under no circumstances should it be brought into politics. All we can say here is that we feel for them.
Speaking of domestic politics, yesterday Tisza released an audio recording from 2023, in which the Minister of Defence talks about building an effective army and the need to move to “phase zero” on the road to war. Tisza says that this proves that the Hungarian government isn’t pro-peace, and is expressly preparing for war. Do you see this statement, which we hear on this recording, as contradicting the pro-peace position?
The recording – if it really is what I’ve read in written form – is the official position of the Government. So the Government’s position is that peace requires strength, peace requires an army. So the Hungarian Defence Forces shouldn’t be confused with the Salvation Army. There’s the Salvation Army, which is a civilian, peaceful corps that’s engaged in peace activities. The Hungarian Defence Forces are there to defend the country in the event of trouble or attack; and to do that we need fighters, we need an army that’s ready and able to fight for Hungary’s freedom and independence if we’re attacked. So we don’t need employees in uniform, but we need fighters. I repeat: peace requires strength! And this is our commitment, this is our official position – it doesn’t need to be dramatically exposed, because it’s in all government documents. What bothers me more is the involvement of the former Chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian Defence Forces in such a clown show. I dismissed the former Chief of Staff. I didn’t give a detailed reason for this, nor do I think it’s necessary, because the army shouldn’t be involved in political debates. I think it’s good that the army is outside party politics, but of course it’s part of the national strategy – and indeed one of the important, decisive players. But it should be kept out of party-political debates, out of battles and disputes for power. Our constitutional system is also based on this, and the army is in this sense excluded from Hungarian political life. Therefore, if something happens there, I try to comment on it in public only as briefly as possible, because any longer commentary will drag the army into the world of political debate. So I haven’t commented at length on the dismissal of the Chief of the General Staff, but yesterday some information came to light that shed light on the real reason. I didn’t feel that the Hungarian army was in safe hands, because I saw its leadership as being pro-Ukrainian rather than pro-Hungarian – or, to be fair, that its leadership perceived the Hungarian interest as being best served by being pro-Ukrainian. But this is wrong! And this isn’t for the army leadership to decide, but for the political leadership, which is responsible for running the country. And our political decision, based on proper analyses, is that supporting Ukraine in this war – and later in the European accession process – is contrary to Hungary’s interests. We have the right to make this decision, even though Mr. Weber has said in the European Parliament that the Ukrainians have the right to join the European Union. This is wrong! Ukrainians have the right to apply for membership of the European Union. We who are in it and are members are the ones who have the right to decide: yes or no. This is the correct description of the situation. And I won’t accept any pressure from outside – let alone from within the Hungarian army – which seeks to push the Hungarian political leadership in the direction of pursuing Ukrainian interests instead of Hungarian interests. In addition, there was a personal issue here, which is why I regret that the former Chief of the General Staff stepped into the political arena – because I thought he’d hide away in shame. Because if it turns out that, in order to look better, a general has had fat sucked out of him in the Hungarian army’s hospital at public expense, then he should disappear – because that’s simply unacceptable. Now, by contrast, he’s putting himself at the centre of political life and attacking the Hungarian political leadership’s military policy and the policy of defending national interests. I don’t think that’s right. It’s a sad story.
In the last twenty minutes or so we’ve been talking about a lot of risks, including economic risks: for example, you and Robert Fico have said that the Commission’s plan is economic suicide. At the same time, the Government has already submitted the 2026 budget to Parliament. Taking into account external and internal influences, risks and factors, how ambitious are the commitments for next year?
In short, very ambitious. So the question for 2026, which the budget must also answer, is this: will Hungarian money be going to Ukraine? Because our financial options will be quite different if money from the Hungarians is sent to Ukraine by Brussels, or if we’re obliged to send money to Ukraine from Budapest. Our options will be quite different if we can prevent this. This budget assumes that in 2026 Hungary will still have a national government: a government that doesn’t send money to Ukraine, that doesn’t send weapons to Ukraine, and that also protects Hungarian interests in terms of money sent from the European Union to Ukraine. This is the budget’s starting point. After all, the political debate in Hungary today is about whether there will be a pro-Ukrainian or a pro-Hungarian government in 2026 – because there will be an election in 2026. We must take a stand on this issue, because we need to build on something. This budget says that after 2026 there will be a national government and a Hungarian-led government, so the Hungarians’ money won’t go to Ukraine, but we’ll spend it here and use it here. The budget is very much committed to family support. I don’t know whether the radio listeners can suddenly make sense of such huge figures in their own world. We’re spending 4.8 trillion forints on family policy and we’ve spent almost 800 billion forints on reductions in household energy bills, with the two together amounting to 5.6 trillion forints. We’ll also spend 7.7 trillion forints on pensioners and retirement benefits. Speaking of the army, an important factor is that in 2026 we’ll be paying the so-called “armed services bonus”, which is an extra six months’ salary that the armed services receive. This will come to 450 billion forints. The policy of teacher pay increases will continue. We’ve also been spending money on economic development, and we’ll be starting the construction of 150 factories instead of 100, because the unfavourable economic growth figures justify it. So we have to do more in that area, which will take 5.05 trillion forints. But at the same time we’re increasing the amount spent on education, and in 2026 we’ll also spend 280 billion forints more on health, which means around 4 trillion forints or so. This is what the budget looks like: optimistic, anti-war and ambitious.
There’s one more risk that the Government has been working to beat down in recent months – and that’s inflation. To further beat it down, the profit margin freeze is now being extended, with the decision on it taken this week. What’s the rationale for this, and what do you expect from this measure?
For years now we’ve been struggling with a major dilemma – because, after all, Hungary has been hit by a huge inflationary shock. So since the Bokros Package [of austerity measures introduced in 1995 by a government led by the Hungarian Socialist Party], which we caused ourselves, inflation has come from within: the result of a bad economic policy. But now it’s come from outside: because of the war. And high inflation has been a punch in the gut, and has hit families and businesses. We’re wrestling with this and trying to bring prices back down to earth. We have the feeling that in quite a few areas the price increases – or their levels – are quite simply unjustified, that there are unacceptable prices which are ultimately exploitative, and that Hungarian families are being exploited. The word “exploited” is perhaps too overassertive here – but in essence they’re being robbed of their money and exploited through high prices. This cannot be allowed. So the Government is there to protect people – especially where protection is fully justified. And here it’s justified. So we need to intervene in the price system. This is a very sensitive issue. Optimally, if there’s no such external shock causing inflation and retailers behave moderately, then there’s no need for the Government to intervene in the price system. But in many countries in Europe – indeed in most countries, including Hungary – intervention has been necessary. This is whether or not you think it’s healthy – because in the longer term it’s obviously not healthy, and the economy has to be able to regulate itself. But now we’ve had to do this, because we have to protect families. It’s very difficult to intervene well. There are all kinds of tools, but if you don’t do things right, in the end families won’t be better off. This is why, after a long period of experimentation and experience, we’ve finally decided to regulate profit margins. I see that it’s working, because we’ve already introduced it for food. Here we’re saying how big a margin a retailer can charge on a product compared to what the retailer bought it for. It’s not just about the profit, because there’s also the cost, and what the maximum total is of both combined. This is what we’re suppressing. This is preventing further price increases, and we’re also bringing back down those prices that have already gone too high. We’ve introduced this for foodstuffs, everyone can see it, they can have an opinion about it, they’ve experienced it. Our measures have certainly caused movement, and prices have changed. What we’ve seen is that families aren’t only plagued by high food prices, but also by outrageously high prices for certain household items. We’ve inventoried these. These are in thirty categories, household goods categories including thousands of products; and we’ve said that the margin for retailers here should not be more than 15 per cent. We hope that this will trigger big price movements and price reductions, and will help families.
I’ve been asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán about subjects including the debates surrounding Ukraine’s accession to the EU and support for it, next year’s budget, and the extension of the profit margin freeze.
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