Zsolt Törőcsik: We can safely say that the already poor relations between Hungary and Ukraine deteriorated further yesterday after Zelenskyy made death threats against Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The Ukrainian president clearly targeted the Hungarian head of government when he said: “We hope that no one in the European Union will block the 90 billion euros, otherwise we will give that person’s address to our armed forces so they can call on him and speak to him in their own language.” My guest is Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Good morning.
Good morning. Yes, a powerful start.
Are you frightened?
That might be an exaggeration. It didn’t feel good.
It’s definitely moved to a new level, compared to what we’ve seen so far – even though you’ve already taken plenty of flak from Ukrainian spokespeople and politicians. But threatening the leader of a NATO and EU country with attack by military personnel is a new level. How can one respond to this?
First of all, we need to understand what we’re talking about. What exactly is the Ukrainian president’s problem? The issue here is that Ukraine has made demands of Hungary, and I’m not acceding to these demands. The government I lead isn’t acceding to them – and won’t accede to them in the future either. We’re standing in the way, the Hungarian government is standing in the way, I’m personally standing in the way, and they want to get rid of us – with threats if possible; because if nice words don’t work, then with threats and blackmail. And of course the Ukrainians also want to get rid of us in the parliamentary election on 12 April, because they know that the best way to achieve their demands in Hungary is by removing the national government and the Prime Minister – who are in their way – and establishing a pro-Ukrainian government in Hungary with a pro-Ukrainian prime minister. These demands seriously harm Hungary’s interests, which is why they must be rejected. At this time we mustn’t give in to blackmail or threats, but we must make it clear that we shall not comply with Ukraine’s demand that we abandon cheap Russian energy – because that would ruin millions of Hungarian households. We shall not support Ukraine in the war, because it is not our war. We shall not give money to the Ukrainians, which they’re successfully extorting from other countries in the European Union. But we shall not pay, we shall not give money. And we shall not let Ukraine into the European Union, because that would ruin Hungary – not only Hungarian farmers, but the entire Hungarian economy. Therefore I’m unable to accept Ukraine’s demands – even if they blackmail us, even if they threaten us with death. Because this isn’t really about me, although it’s focused on me: it’s actually about whether Hungary will comply with Ukraine’s demands. And it’s my conviction that we must not comply, because the country would pay the price.
Incidentally, Zelenskyy is speaking increasingly openly about the Hungarian election. It received less attention, but at the same press conference yesterday he also said that he has no intention of reopening the Druzhba pipeline, saying that they shouldn’t give oil to Orbán, because without oil he can’t win the election. Is this the key, could it be decisive in the election?
First of all, the situation is clear: there are no technical problems with the oil pipeline, with the Druzhba oil pipeline, that would make it impossible for oil shipments from Russia – which are vital to us – to reach Hungary. What’s behind this is a political decision. The Ukrainians have decided to cut Hungary off from the Russian oil that we’re entitled to. It’s our oil, we have a contract with the Russians, we pay for it properly, and it should be allowed to pass through Ukrainian territory – as Ukraine has committed to in an international agreement. So this is bandit-style behaviour: they commit to an international obligation in an international treaty, and then they don’t comply with it – in order to blackmail Hungary. What’s happening today is state banditry, and we must find the appropriate responses to it. That’s one thing. The other is that the Ukrainians make no secret of the fact that they’re not only cheering on the openly Ukraine-friendly, pro-Ukrainian Tisza Party, but also providing it with financial and political support. The Ukrainians want Hungary to have a pro-Ukrainian government rather than a national government, and they’re giving Tisza the necessary support to achieve this – while organising the necessary attacks against us. They’d see it as that kind of attack if energy supply insecurity develops in Hungary, if prices rise and if fuel problems emerge. They hope that the Government will be unable to handle the situation, that as a result the national government will take a hit, making it easier to remove from their path the obstacle represented by us – by the Government and me. This is the game going on in the background.
You’ve talked about many things, saying that in this situation Hungary must find the right answers. Right now Hungary is blocking the twentieth package of sanctions and the 90-billion-euro loan. The German foreign minister has said that this is unacceptable, and this week von der Leyen and Zelenskyy also agreed that accepting these measures remains a priority. Will Hungary’s blocking of these measures be enough, or will further measures be necessary?
First of all, Hungary is only exercising its right. The point is that if anyone wants to grant a loan to Ukraine at the expense of the European budget, it will require unanimity, a unanimous decision. In other words, we have the right to say yes or no. No one – not even the Germans – can demand that we say yes. We shall respond as our interests require. Because Hungary’s participation in this decision isn’t a favour, but our right. In the EU we’ll act according to what serves Hungary’s interests, with full rights. And in Brussels we shall never support any financial assistance to Ukraine until the Ukrainians give us – allow the transit of – the oil that they must allow to pass through, according to the international treaty. If they play fast and loose with the Hungarians and commit serious acts of blackmail against us, then they cannot expect us to make financial decisions in Brussels that support Ukraine. We shall not do so. Until order is restored, we shall use every measure and all means at our disposal. We’ve stopped petrol deliveries to Ukraine, we’re not delivering diesel either, but we’re still delivering electricity. And until Ukraine approves oil deliveries to us, we’ll also stop deliveries of goods that are important for Ukraine and that pass through Hungary.
It seems as if Kyiv/Kiev and Budapest are each waiting for the other to jerk the steering wheel to one side. How much strength does Hungary still have to enable it to wait until Kyiv/Kiev changes course? For example, what’s the state of Hungary’s oil reserves?
The Ukrainians will run out of money sooner than we run out of oil.
But it’s clear that fuel prices are continuously rising here as well. Obviously there are reasons for this, linked to the crisis in the Middle East, which we’ll discuss later, but prices have risen by tens of forints in just a few days – with petrol rising by 6 forints and diesel by 15 forints today alone. In Germany a litre of petrol already costs well over the equivalent of 800 forints. Should we expect the same here?
Trying to predict the future of energy prices on the global market is essentially fortune-telling. Hungary is currently facing two problems at once: there’s the war in the Middle East, which is driving up prices on the world market; and there’s the Ukrainian oil blockade, which is driving up prices regionally. So we’re now suffering from two things, which is why what Zelenskyy is doing to Hungary is an offence of the highest order. What he’s doing to us would be a crime in any case, but in the current global market conditions, in the shadow of a war in the Middle East, it’s a double crime against Hungary. If cheaper Russian oil arrives, it will be easier for us to deal with the issue of rising prices. In any case, we’re monitoring the international situation, and when the situation in Hungary becomes untenable, we’ll intervene in the pricing system, in price formation. We’re not involved in that today, as prices are set by traders and buyers. So in Hungary today the market decides how much you have to pay for natural gas. But if it gets too high and Hungary’s economic stability is shaken, then – even though no one likes this kind of thing – we’ll step in with government measures. This happened in 2022. I’d like to avoid that – but if not, then so be it. We have the knowledge, the experience, and we’re familiar with the tools needed to do this. We shall protect Hungarians from unbearable energy prices, even if there’s a war in the Middle East, and even if Zelenskyy tries to play fast and loose with us and block the energy supplies we’re entitled to.
There are also experts associated with the Tisza Party, for example, who believe that the tax on petrol should be reduced because it’s extremely high – and in any case, they say it’s impossible for one litre of petrol to cost a thousand forints.
We’ll see about that. I hope they’re right. Their basic assumption is wrong. I don’t think they’re lying – although who knows. It’s more likely a case of ignorance – meaning they probably aren’t familiar with international comparative data. If you look at the petrol prices and tax rates in the region and in Hungary’s neighbouring countries, you’ll see that Hungary is among the best. So it’s exactly the opposite of what they say. The tax on petrol is lower in Hungary than in neighbouring countries. They’re making a fatal professional blunder. I understand Shell, because they’re obviously behind it. So let’s be honest: in this whole situation, Shell is the winner. Shell delegated its candidate for energy minister to Tisza. In this situation Shell is making a killing. It’s also making a lot of money from the Ukrainian blockade; because if we don’t have cheap Russian oil, we’ll have to buy international Western oil – for which Shell is one of the biggest operators. In other words, we’ll be buying more expensive fuel and more expensive crude oil from them. They stand to gain a lot from this – both the company itself and its shareholders. And Shell shareholders are present in Tisza – so they’re improving their own financial situation by worsening Hungary’s situation. This is called a conflict of interest, when your private interests conflict with the interests of the country. You can make money while harming your country. Well, that’s how those people are…
Incidentally, it’s interesting to note that on Monday, after the start of the war in Iran, one of the biggest winners on the London Stock Exchange was Shell – precisely because of the rise in its share price.
How can I put it, we’re gentlemen and this is Hungarian public radio, so let’s be polite. But it’s obvious: it’s all about money. They want to fleece the Hungarian people. As an alternative shadow government programme, the Tisza Party is about nothing other than stopping the national government’s policy of taking the money from large multinational companies, banks, energy companies, such as Shell, and giving it to Hungarian families. They don’t want to suffer any more losses: they want bigger profits, and they want to pocket the money instead of giving it to the people, as we’re forcing them to do today. This is why they’re so unrelenting towards me. And this isn’t about politics, but actually about money.
But Tisza’s move is interesting. I don’t know what you see behind it, but summarising the situation, MEP Csaba Dömötör has said that Tisza Party MEPs voted for six proposals aimed at banning Russian energy imports. At the same time, this week Péter Magyar offered to go to Kiev with you and visit the Druzhba pipeline to see for yourselves what condition it’s in and whether or not it’s actually usable. But you didn’t accept that offer.
Hungary has set up a fact-finding expert committee. I wouldn’t count myself among them – there is knowledge that not even a prime minister possesses. This is technical knowledge, which requires experts. Under the leadership of State Secretary Czepek, we’ve set up a fact-finding committee, which is already in talks with the Slovaks. We’re demanding that they be allowed into Ukraine to see the situation on the ground. Anyway, we know what the situation is, we have satellite images, we have intelligence information, and we have international standards that can be used to assess the condition of a facility. So we’re certain – we have evidence – that the oil pipeline is operational. Zelenskyy also admits that he wouldn’t want to restart deliveries to Hungary – of course he says it’s not possible, but even if it were, he wouldn’t want to. Well, he also admits that it’s a political issue. But this game must be played according to the rules of diplomacy. A fact-finding committee must be set up, which we’ve done; and now we’re demanding that the Hungarian – and later possibly a Slovak committee – be allowed to visit the site so that we can examine it on the spot. I’ve also suggested that if the European Union wants to help, if Brussels wants to help, then Brussels’ experts should also participate in such a fact-finding committee. In this way, perhaps with the involvement of a party independent of the dispute, we can prepare a fact-finding report that will settle the matter.
Let’s stay with Hungarian–Ukrainian relations for one more question. It seems that the release of the two prisoners of war from Transcarpathia has further worsened the situation, as Kyiv/Kiev has said that this move is a serious violation of international law. First, let’s talk about what it took for Hungary to free these two men – because Péter Szijjártó has stated very clearly that Moscow didn’t ask for anything in exchange for the prisoners.
First of all, the situation hasn’t worsened, but improved: two Hungarians have been freed. Until now they were prisoners, prisoners of war, and they were suffering. Now they’re free men, they’re in Hungary, they’re not suffering, they’re receiving medical care, and they can decide their futures as free men. So this isn’t bad news, it’s good news. I don’t understand what the Ukrainians have against this. We’re talking about Ukrainian–Hungarian dual citizens, and now two people with Ukrainian citizenship are in a better situation than they were earlier. Why can’t this be cause for celebration? And of course we don’t make deals. If someone asked for something in exchange for prisoners of war, we’d discuss it and then decide whether or not to give something in return. But that isn’t the case. We’re in constant consultation with the Russians, and if there are Hungarian prisoners of war, especially if they were conscripted, the Russians are willing to hand them over to us – particularly if they’re dual citizens, meaning that they’re Hungarian not only in a cultural sense, but also in a legal sense. This is only right. And in the opposite situation we’d do the same.
Prisoners of war had to be freed from there, from Russia. But the war in the Middle East also affects many Hungarians, as there are many Hungarians in the region. Several evacuation flights have already departed with them, and in the programme we’ve spoken with a father who returned home not long ago. How many more would like to come home, and can everyone who wants to come home do so? Let’s start this block of questions with this.
Yes, in the end we’ll bring everyone home. I’m receiving reports, several a day. They’re all about the evacuation flights we’re launching. I think that Hungarians have already arrived home today, this morning. There are a lot of them – we’re talking about several thousand people. Civil aviation is hectic and unpredictable, with airspace being opened and closed. I wouldn’t take any risks, so I advise those who are stranded abroad to be patient, even if it’s difficult; of course you want to get home as soon as possible, but you won’t get home if the plane you’re on is shot down. And the risk of that is high. This is why flights can only be safely operated during certain periods. We’ll do everything we can to ensure that all Hungarians return home safely.
The situation in the Middle East has, and may continue to have, indirect effects – one of which could be a new wave of migration. The UN has already drawn attention to this – they’ve said that 100,000 people have fled Tehran alone. And the International Organization for Migration has also warned that Europe could face another immigration crisis. How prepared do you think Hungary and Europe are for this situation?
Europe is completely unprepared. Iran is a country of 90 million people. The 2015–16 migrant crisis culminated in the outbreak of civil war in Syria, and people fled the devastation of civil war – mostly towards Türkiye, then through Türkiye to the Balkans, and through the Balkans to the Hungarian border and Hungary. We stopped them here – unlike all the Western European countries, that took them in. We built a fence and didn’t let them through, and we haven’t let them in since. Hungary has a system in place whereby only those who have been given prior permission by us can enter Hungarian territory. So we avoided the trap that Westerners are suffering from, in which they first allow the entry of migrants, who wait there for the legal process to be successfully completed. If it is, they stay; and if it isn’t, they stay anyway. This is the problem for Western Europeans. I’ve avoided this trap. So we say that they have to wait outside, they have to wait outside the fence. If the answer is yes, you can come in; and if the Hungarian authorities say no, then move on! This system is now under attack. So Brussels is working to force us to adopt Western Europe’s failed migration policy. But we’re resisting this – which is why we’re being punished and are subject to financial sanctions. But our security is more important than anything else: I don’t want terrorist acts to take place in Hungary, or criminal groups to form – as they have in Western Europe – and Hungarians to feel unsafe. I definitely don’t want the number of migrants to increase to such an extent that they take over our country. So, from the perspective of our children and grandchildren, it is also crucial that no one can enter Hungary without the permission of the Hungarian authorities. We shall not allow anyone – not even a single world power, including Brussels – to tell us who we must live with. That’s outrageous, and we reject it! Here, too, there’s a divergence in Hungarian domestic politics, because DK [Democratic Coalition] and Tisza want to follow Brussels’ migration policy. On 1 July the Migration Pact will come into force, requiring us to accept migrants who have become surplus to requirements in the West, and to build refugee camps in Hungary. We say no to these things. We say no to all this. So Hungary is in a constant state of readiness – not because there’s migration pressure from the east, but because Brussels wants to force a bad migration policy on us. So in order to resist successfully, we must be constantly on alert. The benefit of this is that if refugees and migrants cross from Iran into Türkiye, then come up through the Balkans as migrants and appear at the Hungarian border, we know exactly how to prevent them from entering, and we shall resist and defend ourselves.
Another indirect consequence could be an increase in the threat of terrorism. In recent days many people – from Europol, to the Italian Prime Minister, to the head of Swedish intelligence – have warned about this. As you’ve said, here in Hungary migration is not a significant phenomenon; in fact, it’s practically non-existent. Nevertheless, how realistic is the possibility of an increased threat of terrorism? Because, as you know, the alert level has been raised.
The more migrants there are in a country, the greater the threat of terrorism and the greater the risk of public order breaking down, which means higher crime rates. People don’t usually say this so bluntly, because they think it’s offensive to migrants – even though it’s the reality. But everyone in Western Europe knows this. And everyone also knows that while the Middle East is apparently thousands of kilometres from Europe, the reality is that the Middle East has already moved into Western European countries. So the Jewish–Arab conflict, the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, isn’t only in the Middle East, but in every country where such communities exist. Previously there were mainly Jewish communities in Europe, but due to migration there are now also huge Muslim communities. This is why the conflict there has moved to Western Europe. This is a problem for London, Paris and Stockholm. We’ve been left out of this because, fortunately, we didn’t allow it to happen. But these countries must be prepared for the fact that the communities that originally belong in the Middle East will want to fight the Middle-East war in their countries as well. Hungary must now bear in mind that, as part of the European Union, we’re members of the Schengen Area – and therefore movement is possible: we aren’t blocking Hungary’s border with Austria. And so terrorist groups and individuals can travel through Hungary or enter Hungary from the West. For this reason we’ve had to strengthen our controls on people crossing the border, targeting certain ethnic groups and certain citizens. We’re monitoring them, keeping track of what’s happening, and gathering information about them so that we can detect any terrorist activity in Hungary in a timely manner. But this is a general European threat, and we’re also part of it – although the level of danger is much lower in Hungary than in Western Europe, thanks to our good migration policy.
These are the indirect effects of the situation in the Middle East – which, however, can be felt directly. And now we’ll return to energy. In addition to the rise in oil prices, gas prices have skyrocketed on European exchanges. This is happening just when, after a cold winter, Europe should be starting to refill its storage facilities. If gas prices remain this high, or rise even higher, how will this affect Europe’s already declining competitiveness, and how can Hungary distance itself from this?
What’s the situation with gas? We’re currently in conflict with Zelenskyy and the Ukrainians because of the oil blockade, but this conflict has happened before, when they shut down gas supplies. So in the past, most of the gas – most of the cheap gas – came to Hungary from Russia via Ukraine. But the Ukrainians shut that off. No one remembers that anymore, as it happened years ago after the outbreak of the war, but they shut it off, cutting Hungary off from cheap Russian gas. This wasn’t felt in Hungary because – since the Crimean War, since 2015–16 – we’ve been building a pipeline chain from Türkiye that bypasses Ukraine from the south, coming up to Hungary. We’re able to have Russian gas transported to Türkiye, and from Türkiye we can bring it to Hungary via the Balkans. If we didn’t have this chain, we’d have had to give up on the reductions in household energy bills in Hungary long ago, and gas prices in Hungary would be the same as in the rest of Europe. So on average a Hungarian family pays 250,000 forints per year on energy bills, most of which is for gas; meanwhile in Poland they pay 800,000 forints, and in the Czech Republic one million forints. We save the difference between the two, partly because of regulated reductions in household energy bills and partly because of cheap Russian gas. Without these, Hungarians would essentially lose an average monthly salary. Zelenskyy has already poked a stick through the spokes once, making the Ukrainian transport route unviable; but we’ve been able to defend ourselves against that, because there’s a bypass route. This is still in place. We must be vigilant in ensuring that the Ukrainians don’t damage the gas pipeline that bypasses Ukraine from the south. They did this to the Germans, because the Germans had also noticed this problem and built a pipeline from Russia called Nord Stream, bypassing Ukraine and transporting gas directly to Germany. But the Ukrainians blew that up, in a very serious military operation. We need to ensure that in such a situation they don’t blow up or damage the gas pipeline system coming from the south – because at that moment we’d have supply problems. So I have to pay attention not only to Hungary, but also to the security of the gas pipeline system passing through other countries; and I have to work together with the leaders of those other countries.
We don’t have much time, but if we look around the world we can see that we’re living in dangerous times, with chaos everywhere. Will the world be as peaceful in the coming years as it was a few years ago – before COVID, let’s say?
People always want better for their children and grandchildren than they had themselves, and they always want greater peace or a more well-founded, calmer peace and life than we’ve had. We must prepare ourselves for the fact that the next four years will certainly continue to be an era of danger throughout the world – but especially in Europe. With regard to the Russo–Ukrainian war, the European Union has announced a military strategy which states that Russia must be defeated on the front lines, and that Europe must provide everything necessary to achieve this – whatever that may be, whether money, weapons or manpower. So over the next four years we must prepare ourselves for an increase in the threat of war; Hungary must rack its brains, and the next government must show strength in finding a solution which will keep Hungary out of a war into which the European Union is becoming increasingly involved. The key words for the next four years are security and non-involvement. We will be safe if we manage to stay out of the war. We didn’t succeed in the twentieth century. Now it’s up to us, the aspiring but unworthy successors – or the unworthy but aspiring successors – to succeed where István Tisza and Miklós Horthy failed.
I’ve been asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán about subjects including the escalating threats from Ukraine, energy issues, and the consequences of the war in the Middle East.
