Zsolt Törőcsik: Diplomatic events have intensified since the United States presented its 28-point peace plan for resolving the Russo–Ukrainian war. The document has been amended several times in recent weeks, and it seems that the parties are moving closer to agreement – albeit slowly. I’ll be asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán how he sees the situation, and the European attitude towards it. Good morning.
Good morning.
Those involved in this peace plan are saying little about it, but the Europeans are saying a lot about it. How encouraging do you see the situation at present?
This should come as no surprise: those who have power act, and those who don’t have it talk. This explains why the Russians and Americans, who are strong, are negotiating and bargaining, while the Europeans – who are weak, not involved in this process, and left out of this important issue concerning the future of Europe – prefer to talk instead. That’s the situation today.
But how dangerous are these statements? Because we’ve heard that the chair of NATO’s military committee has raised the possibility of pre-emptive strikes against Russia. Manfred Weber has said that the European Union should be transformed into a European NATO, and Putin has responded by saying that if Europe started a war against Russia there would be no one to negotiate with. That seemed like a pretty direct threat.
We’re undoubtedly in a dangerous moment. This has been the case continuously over the past four years. There have been differences in certain phases: there have been times when we were closer to war spreading across Europe, and there have been times when that risk was lower. We’re now in a very tense moment, and the next few days will decide whether the war will come closer to Europe, whether it will spread in our direction, or whether the flames of war will be extinguished once and for all. Right now two things are happening at once. A series of ongoing US–Russian negotiations is taking place. If they’re successful, the flames of war will certainly be extinguished, and then we here in Hungary can breathe a sigh of relief. We’re not out of the woods yet, but we may be facing a less tense and risky period. The war may come closer to us and the threat of war will increase if the will that prevails is that of the Europeans, who believe that the war must continue – in other words, that peace shouldn’t be sought, but that the war must continue and be resolved on the battlefield. The next few days will determine the direction that events will take. It’s less in the public eye, but if my reading of the news this morning is correct, there’s an important meeting taking place in Belgium today, attended by the German chancellor and perhaps even the President of the Commission. This is to persuade the Belgians to seize Russian assets frozen in Belgium, throw it into Europe’s coffers, and from this sum – of course with clever legal solutions, but ultimately from this sum – arrange financing of the war in Ukraine so that the fighting can continue on the battlefield. If there’s a solution to this, and the Europeans successfully negotiate it among themselves, then in the coming period a great deal of money will flow into Ukraine. Then it will be Hungary’s job to somehow stay out of it – because we don’t want to send money there, and we don’t want to get involved in this war. But if the Belgians – who are physically holding this money – resist, then European leaders will have to admit that there’s no money for the war in Ukraine, and therefore the solution shouldn’t be sought on the front line, because that would cost a lot of money and human lives, but that instead they should support the Americans in their negotiations with the Russians. This is the situation, this is the stalemate, and it will remain so for the next three or four days; but in a few days it may come to an end, and then we’ll have an answer to whether we can expect the war to spread and intensify in the coming months, or whether the chances of peace will increase.
Incidentally, the Belgian prime minister made a very honest and pointed statement in this regard, when he said that anyone who truly believes that Russia will lose in Ukraine is living in a fairy tale, because it’s a complete illusion. Does this indicate some kind of change? Because, according to Brussels, Ukraine should be supported so that it can negotiate from the strongest possible position, and not because it’s preparing for more war.
Yes, the Belgians are in a unique position here, because they hold frozen Russian assets. The Belgians are very strong in that business, which involves managing the currency reserves of various countries. We also have such currency reserves, which we have to manage. Managing them requires complex financial knowledge: how much money to hold in which currency, where to place it, and so on. In the world today, one of the reserve currencies – second only to the dollar – is the euro, the currency of the European Union. In the interest of safety, many countries – not only Russia, but others as well, rich countries – keep part of their currency reserves in euros, outside their own borders. Before the war the Russians did the same thing. We’re talking about 200 billion euros, which is a huge amount of money, which they thought would be safe in Europe and in euros. These transactions are handled by Belgian companies, which have taken on the responsibility of ensuring that the Russians get their money back and can access it when they need it. And by freezing these assets the European Union has put these Belgian companies in an impossible situation. This is unprecedented, by the way, as in international law it’s not exactly recognised practice for a power – say the European Union – to suddenly say that although it’s your money, from now on you can’t access it. And I have to say that in Europe, in Western Europe, where there’s a complete liberal media monopoly and 98 per cent of the media is pro-war, they’re selling Europeans the illusion that this war won’t cost them a penny. “So you, my dear friend Franz there on the outskirts of Munich, or there in the suburbs of Paris, or in Spain, or in the mountains, you don’t have to worry, because this war won’t cost you a penny: we’ll cover the cost of this war from the frozen, impounded – and ultimately expropriated – Russian assets. This is why in some countries there’s no strong anti-war sentiment: they think that the war is far away, they live on the Atlantic coast, and it won’t cost them any money because their leaders have said that they’ll solve everything with Russian assets. And now we have a moment when it turns out that it’s not that simple. For example, the Belgians don’t want to take the risk that if they get their hands on this money, later on they’ll most likely lose in international lawsuits, and they’ll have to pay up. And the Belgian prime minister is speaking as sharply as I do, or as we Hungarians do, because this game isn’t being played for small change. If he doesn’t receive guarantees that in the event of an international lawsuit someone will repay the Russians their missing money and everything else that goes with it, with interest, that someone will take that liability from him, then he can’t go along with it – because otherwise it would ruin Belgium financially. This is why we in Central Europe are pacifists on principle, while it’s for financial reasons that the Belgians want someone to finally turn down the heat in the war.
Further support for Ukraine is also interesting because the Ukrainian corruption scandal has continued to spread. After the golden toilet, now there’s talk of a golden bathtub. Brussels, however, is optimistic. According to Kaja Kallas, the scandal itself is proof that anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine are working, so in fact everything’s fine. How do you think Brussels should handle this issue?
Brussels is in a difficult position, because its own house is on fire. So it has to extinguish the flames of a Ukrainian corruption scandal while its own house in Brussels is ablaze. This is also an instructive story for us. It’s no longer on the agenda, but a year ago the news broke that the man who represented the Belgian government in the European Commission – and who was responsible for justice, transparency, and the rule of law – was in trouble with the law. This man’s name is Reynders, who used to entertain himself by using us as a doormat, morning, noon. and night. But suddenly the Belgian police collared him because it turned out that he was involved in a suspicious corruption and money laundering case. This was the man who had been picking on us, to put it mildly. And now it turns out that the second-in-command in the European Union – who was second-in-command up until five years ago, at that time the Commission’s vice-president, commissioner for foreign affairs and Italy’s representative on the Commission – did something about which we don’t have precise knowledge, but in the past few days there have been house searches, police involvement and arrests. So suspicious things are happening. The European Union is awash with corruption, and it’s not only the aforementioned Commission, these two members of the Commission, but the European Parliament is also rife with corruption cases. Now Brussels, which is drowning in corruption, needs to say something intelligent about corruption in Ukraine. All I can say is that this is obviously not possible, because what’s happening in Ukraine is also happening in Brussels. In such cases, it’s a case of one hand washing the other, and the most we can expect is that the Commission won’t be in an easy position.
The other way Brussels could support Ukraine is by banning Russian energy imports. This week the Council and Parliament agreed to ban EU countries from purchasing pipeline gas from 2027. In light of this, what’s the value of the results negotiated in Washington and Moscow?
What we’ve been discussing so far has been more about foreign policy, which affects us because we’re members of the EU. But what you’ve just asked about is very much a matter of Hungarian domestic economics. In fact, it’s a crucial issue. Perhaps everyone in Hungary already knows that there will be tragic economic consequences if gas and oil don’t come to Hungary from Russia. This is because it will mean that household utility costs will triple, according to conservative estimates – or three and a half times, according to others. During the heating season everyone can calculate how much their monthly energy bills are, how much their gas and electricity bills are. In the case of oil, if there’s no Russian oil, fuel prices will skyrocket. Therefore it’s vital for the Hungarian economy and Hungarian families that Hungary remains on the supply route along which oil arrives from Russia and gas arrives from another direction. It’s no coincidence that I’ve invested so much energy in averting the threats looming here. There were two threats that we’ve already averted. One was from the American sanctions on energy purchases from Russia, effectively making them impossible; we had to ensure that those sanctions wouldn’t apply to Hungary. So, on behalf of the entire country, I’ve already expressed Hungary’s gratitude on several occasions. Let’s be honest, we’re not a very grateful people, and when it comes to international politics we don’t dwell on feelings. But now the situation is different. So we should definitely thank and express our gratitude to the President of the United States. Obviously due to the size disparity he isn’t preoccupied with Hungary’s energy supply and the energy costs for Hungarian households, but ultimately he allowed us to convince him that while his policy may be a reasonable step globally, its effects on Hungary are unreasonable, since the American sanctions weren’t intended to ruin the Hungarian people. He recognised this, and we reached an agreement that Hungary will be exempt from the sanctions as long as he’s the US president and there’s a pro-peace government here in Hungary. The second agreement had to be made with the Russian president. The war that’s in progress there is one in which the Ukrainians are now also striking Russian territory, primarily Russian energy institutions or energy stations: compressor stations and pipelines; and soon they’ll even be striking extraction sites. And obviously for Russia, Russia comes first. But we needed a guarantee that whatever happens to the Russian energy system, we’ll still receive the amount of oil and gas that we negotiated earlier and signed contracts for. We’ve confirmed these agreements, so we have a confirmed contract with Russia that both oil and gas – what’s known as “nafta” – will arrive in Hungary in accordance with the agreed terms. That’s one heavy stone – and so two heavy stones have been lifted from around our neck. But there’s a third stone around our neck, and that’s from Brussels. This is because – regardless of America – Europe also wants to impose sanctions: it wants to impose a total ban on the use of Russian oil and gas. This would pull Hungary back into the situation from which we pulled ourselves when we reached an agreement with the President, the American president. The difference is that the American sanctions have already come into force. So if those negotiations had failed, here in Hungary we’d already be in deep trouble – millions of families would be in a very difficult situation. The situation with the European decision is that they’re currently planning to implement it in 2027. So we’ve gained some time there, and we can hope that that entire sanctions policy will be a thing of the past – because if the peace talks are successful and there’s peace, then obviously a decision will be made to lift the sanctions. And in that event the whole threat will be removed from Hungary. This means that the best solution for Hungary’s energy supply and financial stability is peace, because peace will sweep away the sanctions system and we’ll be able to return to normal cooperation. What we need to achieve in Brussels now is either that this decision isn’t taken, or that it comes into force as late as possible.
At the same time, in addition to legal attacks there are also physical attacks, aren’t there? This week the Druzhba oil pipeline was attacked again. Which is more dangerous: legal attacks or physical attacks?
Let’s not forget that Brussels is playing with marked cards. So, according to every lawyer who’s ever dealt with international law or commercial law, banning the purchase of Russian gas and oil is a sanction. The peculiarity of sanctions is that the EU can only take such a decision if all Member States support it. But since Hungary doesn’t support it, they couldn’t make such a decision with regard to Hungary. That’s because when sanctions were introduced I insisted that I’d only support them if Hungary and Slovakia – with whom we’re part of the same system, the same pipeline system – were excluded. I’m not saying that it was easy, that it was on friendly terms, or that it was as part of a civilised drawing room conversation or chat. It took place under difficult circumstances, but we achieved this exemption – I achieved it, I negotiated it. And since the situation was that there would be no sanctions at all if they didn’t grant us an exemption, I had the means to achieve this. Now they’ve come up with the idea – and this is why I say that they’re playing with marked cards – that what they’re doing now isn’t actually a sanction, but a trade policy decision. And, according to EU law, trade policy doesn’t require unanimity: it can be decided by majority vote. In other words, they’re circumventing the Hungarian veto. This is completely illegal, a clear violation of existing legislation. If we can still talk about the rule of law in Europe, then this is a clear violation of that rule of law. We shall take legal action against the Commission for this. So if it takes this decision, we’ll seek legal redress – which of course won’t get us out of the woods, because by the time a legal case is completed in Europe, the war will have ended eight times over. But in any case, we have to point out that the European Union has strayed from the path of law, from the path of the rule of law – that it’s violating the law, abusing its power, and that this abuse of power must have consequences later on. That’s how things stand for now. Sorry, that wasn’t the question. The question was that there’s also a physical danger, wasn’t it? Well, I’ve explained the legal danger in such detail so that you can understand that in Brussels this isn’t a simple game. It takes more than just political courage – because we’re not doing too badly in that regard in historical terms, and the current government isn’t lacking in it either; but it also requires very serious legal knowledge and the intellectual strength needed to fight a legal battle – which Minister János Bóka’s ministry is providing us with, so far with excellent results in my opinion. Now, the physical danger. The physical threat stems from the fact that the Ukrainians have received and developed weapons that allow them to wage war not only on the front lines, but also to fire beyond the Russian border. The Russians are firing on all of Ukraine’s energy facilities – distributors, compressor stations, and so on, effectively crippling Ukraine’s energy supply for the winter. Therefore the Ukrainians are retaliating, and are now also firing into Russian territory. This is why it’s important for those who are following this to know what types of weapons the West is giving to the Ukrainians. Are they also providing weapons that can reach as far as Siberia or Moscow, the Russian heartland? And they are indeed damaging Russian supplies. Estimates vary, but at least 10 per cent of Russia’s energy capacity has been crippled by military strikes there. This raised the question of whether under these circumstances Russia would honour its previously agreed supply contracts; but we’ve agreed with the Russians that there could be no military situation in the Russian heartland that would prevent them from supplying Hungary. So on that we have a live guarantee.
Turning to the domestic economy, the Tisza Party’s economic plan has been leaked – even though the party denies its existence. This would involve taking 3.7 trillion forints from businesses and 1.3 trillion from families. How do you see this affecting the economy? Why would Tisza want to raise taxes if the budget situation doesn’t justify it and they know that it would be unpopular?
Well, the Left loves raising taxes, regardless of the actual situation in the country. The Left believes that money is better off with them, with politicians, than with businesses and the people. So they think that the economy is unfair if only businesses and employers are deciding what to do with the money in the economy. Money flows in the economy according to economic rationality, leading to injustices, they say, that must be resolved by taking as much of this money as possible from employers: from businesses and from the people. And they – politicians – will redistribute this money on the basis of some kind of justice, with their understanding of where the money should go being better than that of those who actually produce the money. This is the fundamental difference between thinking on the Left and the Right. Because we believe that the most important things are work and performance: let people work, let them earn money, and let them decide what to do with their money. This is a concept of the Right. The Left wants to dictate this. So, regardless of the current state of the economy, regardless of what’s in the budget, the Left always raises taxes, always interferes in the economy, always regulates; meanwhile the Right only wants to collect as much tax as is absolutely necessary to cover collective costs, and strives to leave as much money as possible in the hands of the people. At most we intervene – sometimes we intervene ourselves, and we intervene on a single point, and that’s intervention for the benefit of families. This is because we want the costs of raising children to be as low as possible, and we don’t want parents raising children to be worse off than those who don’t have children. This is why we provide family tax allowances, why we’ve introduced a family tax allowance system, and why we support families with children. So here we have two conflicting worldviews. As for the specifics, they further worsen the situation, and Tisza’s programme is so terrible that when you read it you get goose bumps or your hair starts falling out – depending on how strong your nervous system is. They even want to send money to Brussels, because Brussels is asking Member States for money to send to Ukraine. If it can’t get its hands on Russian assets, in order to continue the war it will have to ask Member States for even more money. We shall not give any money: the Hungarian Right shall not give any money, it shall not send any money to Ukraine, and it doesn’t care if this leads to conflict with Brussels. We shall fight it out. The Hungarian Left, led by Tisza, has a different opinion on this. They believe that Brussels’ request is justified: if Brussels asks for money, it should be given money, and Brussels is right to support the war. So here we’re talking about Tisza and DK [Democratic Coalition]: pro-Ukrainian Hungarian parties which approve of the continuation of the war. They’d give money to Brussels for this, and Brussels would send this money to Ukraine – it’s that simple. But this money has to be collected from someone. It can be collected from wherever it’s available – and it’s available from families and businesses; so they’d take over a trillion forints from families and 3 trillion forints – or I don’t know, 3.5 trillion – from businesses. This explains this truly insane programme that they’ve made public. And it should be taken seriously, because it’s a signed programme. So I see that there’s a debate about whether this is real or not. These have been signed – I’ve seen the chapters myself; the person responsible for Tisza’s economic policy programme has signed the papers. So there’s nothing left to discuss: this is a real programme, this is a real threat, and if the Hungarian people decide to choose this programme, they have to be aware that it will have serious financial consequences for their businesses, their jobs, and their family budgets.
This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that yesterday an agreement was reached on the minimum wage, which next year will increase by 11 per cent. Do you know whether – under the current circumstances, and if circumstances change – businesses will be able to manage this increase?
If Tisza’s programme were to come into effect, God forbid, then of course we could forget about the minimum wage increase. So, with the economic policy programme that’s now been leaked, it won’t be possible to implement the 11 per cent or 7 per cent minimum wage increase. That would require an economic policy of the Right. The parties that reached the agreement – the trade unions on one side and the employers on the other – have assumed that the current economic policy will remain in place. If the current economic policy remains in place, then they’ll be able to implement this minimum wage increase, because they’ve agreed on it, with the Government only playing a mediating role. If economic policy changes, this agreement will fall apart in an instant.
Let’s talk about one more thing, because exactly twenty-one years ago today there was a referendum on dual citizenship, which unfortunately caused deep wounds in the relationship between Hungarians in the mother country and those living beyond the borders. Have these wounds healed today, twenty-one years later?
I think so. On the night of the referendum I was among those who saw the vote as a victory. I think I was only one in a hundred, that was more or less the ratio; that was because I didn’t think that Hungarians would support dual citizenship for Hungarians living beyond the borders in sufficient numbers to enable us to belong to a community not only in spiritual, cultural and linguistic terms, but also politically and in terms of public law. The Left has always agitated, educated or trained against this: there’s one culture in Hungary that says that a Hungarian is someone who lives in Hungary. This is the position of the Left. And there’s a culture of the Right, according to which we’re a great nation that’s been torn apart and unjustly broken into pieces – but that Hungarians who have ended up outside the borders are still Hungarians. This means that the borders of the nation and the borders of the state do not coincide. These are two different philosophies. But I was happy that on 5 December there were more “yes” votes than “no” votes. I was happy, because I knew that the moment would come when we’d get an opportunity from God and the Hungarian voters to win a two-thirds majority – because if you want to grant citizenship you need a two-thirds majority. The moral basis for a later decision was established, because if there are more “yes” votes than “no” votes, then by referring to that referendum the Government would be able to grant dual citizenship. And after we got the two-thirds majority in 2010, our first decision was to refer back to that referendum – which was a bad memory and a shock for many people, but in which there was still a majority. And we introduced dual citizenship on that basis. And, most importantly, there’s been a change on the Left as well. So the culture of the Left, according to which anyone who doesn’t live in Hungary isn’t Hungarian, has withered. I can see that there are still some leading figures who hold that view, but it’s regressed and weakened; meanwhile the other side – which says that the country has borders, the state has borders, but the nation doesn’t, and that all Hungarians in the world belong to one nation – has grown stronger. So I think that we’ve already moved beyond that painful referendum of 5 December, both in terms of public law and in cultural and philosophical terms, and we’re working hard to create Hungarian national unity.
I’ve been asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán about subjects including Brussels’ position on the war, energy issues, and the Tisza Party’s policy package.
