Menu
Zsolt Törőcsik: Today marks the end of Voks2025, the consultative poll on Ukraine’s fast-track EU membership, in which more than two million people have so far expressed their views on whether they support our eastern neighbour’s accession to the European Union. One of the questions I’ll be asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is what the Government will do with the result of the vote. Good morning.
Good morning.
What should be considered by those who are still thinking about filling in their ballot papers? Now, on its last day, what’s at stake in this vote?
I suggest a simple consideration. If two million and a few hundred thousand people thought the issue to be important, it certainly is. So those who have stayed out of it so far should now listen to the others. So we’re talking about an issue which at least two million people have already said is important. We don’t yet know the sum of the opinions expressed, but more than two million people have certainly said that it’s important, that they want to form an opinion on it, and that they want the country’s leaders to know what their opinion is. And if it’s important to two million people, then I think it’s also important to the remaining three, four or five million. So I urge voters to follow the example of their fellow citizens who have already cast their ballots. This is the most important issue determining the future and destiny of Hungary over the next few years.
But this week, for example, Zoltán Tarr – an MEP for the Tisza Party – said that this vote is completely useless. What’s your view of the value of the two million – or we’ll see how many – votes that have been cast?
Let’s look at this from another angle. Let’s say we put ourselves in the shoes of a farmer from Békés [in south-eastern Hungary] who gets on his tractor and works every day. And if he thinks about his future, about the opportunities and dangers that lie ahead of him, he should consider the effect of Ukraine being admitted to the European Union – something which, by the way, is being pushed for by the whole European Union, a large majority bloc in the Union including the Tisza Party, DK, the European People’s Party, the Socialists, von der Leyen and the Commission. So if a tractor driver from Békés thinks about Ukraine being admitted to the EU by 2030, it will mean that a large part – or all – of the land-based subsidies will be lost, because there will be no money for land-based subsidies, as the money will be going to Ukraine. Or he can think about the fact that if Ukraine is admitted and cheap Ukrainian grain is allowed in, he may be able to grow his own grain here, but he certainly won’t be able to sell it – or he’ll only be able to sell it at a very low price, because he won’t be able to compete with Ukrainian grain, which will always be cheaper. Or a waiter in Budapest earning, say, 600–700,000 forints [per month], might think about the fact that if the Ukrainians are admitted to the EU sometime between 2026 and 2030, the Hungarian government will have no instrument for preventing hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian workers from coming to Hungary. We have that instrument in our hands now. Today I can stop it, but if they become members I won’t be able to. And then his work, which he’s been doing for 600–700,000 forints, will be done by Ukrainians for 500,000, and he’ll lose his job. And it won’t be five Ukrainians coming in – it will be hundreds of thousands, because clearly the difference in salaries is enormous. And there are millions of people in Ukraine who can’t make a living there. So this is the kind of threat that Ukrainian membership brings with it – a direct threat to our daily lives. This is what we should think about when we talk about Voks2025.
At the same time, you’ve said that in Brussels the entire institutional system and a large part of the political forces are working to ensure that Ukraine becomes a member as soon as possible. Incidentally, one of the politicians involved in the upcoming Danish Presidency made a comment on this in the past few days, saying that they’ll also be working on this over the next six months. If Brussels is so determined to admit Ukraine, how can people’s opinions help you – for example at the EU summit next week?
From the preliminary signs I can see that next week’s EU summit is going to involve a lot of ugly work. Of course this ugly work has its own beauty, because there will be a big debate; I hope it will be kept within an intelligent framework – although things don’t always work out like that, with room for emotion sometimes. At times like this I need two things. One of them is already to hand: it’s called experience. It’s a great advantage for me and for Hungary, because of all the leaders there, Hungary’s government has been in place for the longest time, since earlier than all the others; and I’ve been the Prime Minister – so I remember how it was in 2010, and I also remember how it was between 1998 and 2002. The others were all somewhere else at that time, and maybe not even in this profession. So experience is very helpful, and there’s a lot to draw on. After all, I’m an eyewitness, and I know when we’ve decided well or badly on things. So if you can keep your composure, which is what I strive to do, if you have strategic calm and experience, then that’s one of the tools. The other tool I need is strength. So it’s not about what the Hungarian prime minister thinks – that may be interesting, but it’s not important; the question that’s not interesting, but important – and can’t be avoided – is what the Hungarian people think. So when I speak on behalf of Hungary, it matters whether I’m representing the Government’s position or clearly representing the position of a country which isn’t a supposition, but a real, declared will of the people – such as Voks2025. This is a force that, even though we’re only 10 million people – compared to, say, 84 million Germans – is still a force that can’t be avoided, bypassed or swept aside. So if you have the experience and the strength, you can achieve results in Brussels.
Let’s also talk about the domestic political situation and the timing of the vote, because recently the Tisza Party president said that Tisza doesn’t support Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the EU either. So there seems to be unity on this – but they say that if the accession negotiations are concluded and the terms are known, they’ll initiate a referendum on this issue. Why do you think – and why does the Government think – that a decision on this issue should be taken now, and not later?
Because it will be decided now. I respect those who are getting involved in politics and international politics now, because it’s always good to have new players and renewal in politics – but experience and facts also count. Once the European Union starts down a path, it can’t be stopped: it’s a steamroller which, once it’s shifted into gear, will move along at its own pace, knocking away everyone in its path. I’ll give you an example. I remember that when the European Union wanted to create new rules, and did create them. But the French and the Dutch voted against them in referendums. Then they waited a year, resubmitted them, worked on society, and got them adopted. So my point is that the European Union shouldn’t be underestimated. The way to block things in the European Union is to prevent them getting started. Once something’s underway, there may be a way to amend it, but that steamroller will roll all the way along its path. So those who think that one day they’ll be able to do something about it later, don’t understand European politics – because they haven’t seen such things before.
What do you think of the attempts to exert pressure on Voks2025 in recent weeks and months – both in domestic politics and from external forces?
We should look at this in the same context as the whole of Hungarian domestic politics. In every country, not just in Hungary – recently I had talks in France, earlier in Spain, and now I’m going to the Netherlands – the formula’s the same, everywhere. There are two kinds of political force. There are national forces that don’t want immigration, that don’t want to hand over powers to Brussels, that don’t want Ukraine to join the European Union. And then there are the political forces that want Ukraine to join, that tolerate and accept – perhaps even want – migration, that are happy to hand over powers to Brussels, and that think that Brussels should tell Member States what to do. That’s another group, but in all countries the formula is more or less the same. It’s the same in Hungary. In terms of the positions of power in Europe, the latter – the pro-Ukrainians, the pro-migrants, the “give as many powers as possible to Brussels” group – are in the majority today. This puts pressure on countries like Hungary – which have national governments – to give up even more powers over our economic policy and follow what Brussels says. A very important development this week, which perhaps we’ll have time to talk about, was related to support or acceptance of the migration regulation, of letting the Ukrainians in – not only into the EU, but maybe even into NATO. So we’re under huge pressure. So this is – how shall I put it? – the natural medium and condition of European politics: patriots, and national governments on the one side; federalists, Brusseleers and pro-Ukrainians on the other side.
The Government’s position is that Brussels would bring the war together with Ukraine into the European Union. But at the same time there’s now a conflict in our wider environment. Even analysts don’t know whether this can really be called a war. It’s the conflict between Israel and Iran. What’s your view on this, from what perspective is it a threat to Hungary? We hear a lot about energy, but there are also security policy aspects.
I should give a longer answer to this, which there’s no time or way to give. Iran is the question. Iran is a very special country. Now, beyond having a huge army, it represents a particular branch of Islam. It’s located along strategic routes, with a strait that they control, through which 20 to 30 per cent of world trade passes, and an even greater proportion of trade in oil. It’s also developing nuclear capabilities. So we’re talking about a strong, large country of over 90 million people. But what’s less well known about Iran is that in terms of its ethnicity, in terms of its nationalities, it’s a mixed country. So there are the Fars people, the Persians, who are in the majority there, at over 50 per cent, although not by much; but there are other ethnic groups who are in a block, like our Hungarians in Székely Land. And if the central Iranian government falls apart, the whole country could fall apart, and then destabilisation could occur. There’s Azerbaijan, for example, which has 10 million citizens now, but 20 million Azeris live on Iranian territory. One is a secular, European-oriented country, similar to us in many ways – that’s Azerbaijan; and the Iranians belong to a religious fundamentalist community. So if Iran falls apart there as a result of the war, there won’t be an isolated conflict hotspot in Iran, but it will spread to many neighbouring countries. Pakistan is in the same situation. So in this conflict the real danger is the unmanageability and uncontrollability of a major region of the world.
What conclusions should we draw from this here in Hungary?
One always looks at the daily oil prices, and that’s exciting; but it’s also worth looking at it in aggregate, from a weekly and monthly perspective. In the last month, Brent oil prices have risen by 20 per cent. Just like that! Hungary needs imports, we import energy, fuel, oil and natural gas. If the price of oil goes up on the world market, it’s always bad for the Hungarians; and war pushes up prices, so war is bad for the Hungarians.
The Government is saying that in this situation it’s economic suicide for the Brussels plan to say that by the end of 2027 the EU – and therefore Hungary too – should be disconnected from Russian natural gas and oil. The other side, however, argues that there are still two and a half years to prepare for this. Why does the Government think that this plan would have such a drastic effect, or even an immediate effect?
Because of the numbers. If we can’t import natural gas from Russia, then the energy bills, the energy bills of families and businesses – but especially of families – will go up two and a half times. So someone who’s been paying 30,000 forints [a month] will be paying 70,000. This isn’t politics – it’s mathematics. This is what will happen. Why would we want that? So the EU wants something – Brussels wants something – that’s against the interests of Hungarians. Why should we accept that? So let’s fight for our interests!
What tools does the Government have at its disposal? Because after the cabinet meeting on Wednesday you said that this was largely what the cabinet meeting was about – how to counter these plans from Brussels.
So far, the way this has been done is to restrict the flow of Russian energy into Europe through sanctions. Sanction decisions – in other words a ban, a ban by Brussels – require unanimity, and therefore a Hungarian vote for them. And what we did was to say that if you want to torpedo yourselves, that’s your business, and we won’t stop you; but you can’t torpedo us – and so such a restriction mustn’t apply to Hungary. And I vetoed it, until it was written in the end and accepted – except for the special case: for Hungary. We were able to bring the Slovaks and the Czechs along with us, because they don’t have coastlines either. This is a big problem for countries that can’t receive transports by sea, but only via pipelines. And we transport energy via pipelines. Back then we vetoed it, and so Hungary got a dispensation. Now they want to take that away from us. It’s a right that was won. This was a big battle, and here I won’t quote what was said, because not all of it would be suitable for an on-air microphone. But in the end we fought successfully for it. And now they want to take it away by trickily saying that this isn’t a sanction, but a trade policy measure. This is blatantly fraudulent, a sleight of hand, and therefore an affront to the rule of law, a disgraceful move from Brussels. But anyway, this is the battlefield, and this is where we’ll fight.
Yes, but, in the meantime there are ever more cases in which the Commission is saying – and last week a Commissioner said this – that on a number of issues they need to move from unanimity to majority voting, so that they can, quote unquote, exclude those Member States that don’t agree. If strategic decisions could be taken against the wishes of individual Member States, what direction would this take the European Union in?
This would mean the end of Hungarian statehood. So let’s not beat around the bush. This would mean the end of one thousand years of Hungarian statehood as we know it: of our sovereignty, our freedom, of our fate being decided by the ten million – currently ten million, but in the past fifteen million – Hungarians who live in this country, in this homeland. Because we may have an opinion, but if the others outnumber us, then unfortunately this one vote won’t prevail, and Hungary’s foreign policy and economic policy won’t be decided in Budapest, won’t be decided by the elected Hungarian parliament and government, won’t be decided by the Hungarian people, but by the bureaucrats in Brussels. This would mean the end of Hungarian statehood. So we’re not talking about a legal, technical issue, but about a very important historical issue.
Now, instead of future or planned decisions, let’s move on to decisions that have already been taken. This week the Commission launched infringement proceedings against Hungary related to the cap on profit margins. Their criticism is that this is forcing shops to sell certain products at a loss. In such a measure, whose interests should the Government be looking after – those of the shops, or consumers and families?
We’re now in two big battles, and if we put aside oil, natural gas and the war in Ukraine – which isn’t too easy – then we’re left with the questions of the interest rate freeze and the regulation of retail profit margins. They want us to abolish the interest rate freeze, because the banks can’t get their money. We are indeed causing the banks a loss of some 55 billion forints, but this money will remain with families. We’re talking about 300,000 families who are affected by the interest rate freeze, who have taken out loans in the past, the interest rates on which have risen so high that if we were to allow the banks to enforce their interest rates, these families would be ruined – 300,000 families! According to our data, 27,000 to 28,000 of them would immediately be ruined financially. They’d be evicted. So we are now protecting around 28,000 families from being evicted from their homes, and another 270,000 from having to pay interest that’s effectively unpayable for them. I don’t know why people in Brussels don’t understand that this is impossible. So we need an interest rate freeze; of course, the legitimate question is for how long. We need an interest rate freeze until the National Bank is in a position to lower interest rates in Hungary through the central bank base rate. The interest rate freeze can be lifted when interest rates are affordable for these families – then, and not before then; otherwise they’ll be ruined. This is one of our battles with Brussels now. This is about the banks’ money. Brussels is saying that it’s not interested in Hungarian families, it’s not interested in these 300,000 families: it’s the banks’ money, and they should be allowed to have it. Incidentally, we’re also in a battle with the banks here: Hungarian banks who have challenged the Hungarian government’s measure – the interest rate freeze – in the Constitutional Court. So we also have an internal dispute here. The other big battle is regulation of retail profit margins. You should think of profit margin regulation as you go into a shop and pay a price today. And prices now are unfairly high. If there was no profit margin regulation, if the profit margin freeze were lifted tomorrow, for most groceries you wouldn’t be paying the same tomorrow as you’re paying today, but, say, 20 per cent more. Do the math! This would be a huge burden for families. So the Hungarian government really is intervening in the setting of prices, and it’s telling retailers, especially the multinationals, “Look, the extra money that you can put on the cost of food production is limited to 10 per cent, and for other products it’s 15 per cent. You can’t make more profit than that.” They want to make more, but I think that these are unjustified profits. So I understand a retailer and a business wanting to make a profit – that’s why they’re in business and that’s why they’re retailers. But there’s a level beyond which it destroys people, beyond which it simply causes financial damage to families. And, in the face of unreasonably high prices, when the world is as crazy as the one we live in, this is why the Hungarian government must intervene to protect families. What does this mean? It means that the profits of the multinationals will be lower because that money will go to families, as they can’t take money away from the families through high prices. The multinational isn’t getting enough money, it’s not getting the profits it wants, and it can’t take them out. And Brussels is always on the side of the multinationals. This is why it’s important for there to be a Hungarian state and a national government; otherwise Brussels will always side with the multinationals, and then we’d see ourselves being stripped or cheated out of what Hungarian families have, with great difficulty, built up over the last fifteen years. So the profit margin cap is simply an instrument to control the cost of living for families, to curb price rises, to limit the profits of the multinationals. But it’s good for Hungarian families. This is what Brussels wants to take out of our hands. It’s called on us to abolish it, and now they’ve started a procedure because we refused to do so. We’ll have a good debate, there will be no convergence of views, and then they’ll take us to the European Court of Justice. This will take a long time, and we hope that by the time the dispute is over, prices will have normalised and for Hungarian families the whole dispute will no longer have any meaning.
Let’s keep with economic issues, because this week the National Assembly adopted next year’s budget – which has families at its heart, and which you’ve described as an anti-war budget. At the same time, what we see on the battlefield is that so far the war has refused to abate. What happens if the war continues? How will the commitments in the budget be kept?
We’ll know that when we get there – we’ll be able to answer that when we get there. This threat that you’re talking about is hanging over our heads. So, if the world goes up in flames, then of course a peacetime budget will have to be adapted; but we’ve tried to design the budget in such a way that we can be flexible if necessary. But this budget is also, how shall I say it, a budget driven by will. So one could also create a budget while saying that one shouldn’t set targets and what we have is fine in times like these, in such a context: threats of world war, war in Israel, the war with Iran; the Russo–Ukrainian war in our neighbourhood, despite the Americans wanting peace, and with the European Union wanting war and wanting to continue the war in Ukraine, and therefore not following the Americans but taking Europe into war. That would also be a reasonable and acceptable position. But that wouldn’t be us, that’s not who we are, we’re Hungarians, we’re not like that, and we must set goals even in difficult times. And it’s not just me, but also, let’s say, the governing party community – and perhaps I can say that our electorate, together with us – who even in such difficult times set goals, and they expect us to set goals. And the truth is that we’ve set big goals. At the beginning of the year I announced that we won’t sit back and wait to see how the world situation develops, but we’ll set goals and we’ll achieve them. And the 2026 budget is proof of that. I’ve been talking about this for six months; but from now on, from July, I’ll finally not only be talking about it, but people will finally see what I’m talking about. This is because from 1 July we’ll be increasing the child tax credit by 50 per cent – meaning that it will be reflected in August salaries. We’ll also make GYED [childcare allowance] and CSED [maternity leave benefit] tax-free from 1 July. People will see this from 1 August. In October we’ll introduce a 15 per cent increase in the salaries of local government employees in settlements with fewer than 10,000 residents, and by another 15 per cent in January. And I’m working on enabling us to raise such salaries in settlements of up to 30,000 residents. In January we’re raising the child tax credit again by 50 percent, and those with two or more children will gain a lifetime exemption from paying income tax. These are huge goals, and we’ve set them. A war may be in progress, there may be threats, but I want to hold onto these goals with all my might, and with all my might I’ll insist on achieving these goals – and we shall achieve them. There may be economic difficulties and everything may be far from perfect, but there are goals that are important to Hungarian families, and the Government must achieve these goals. And these goals are laid down in the Budget Act. From now on, they’re not just a commitment on the part of the Government, but a legal obligation. This must be done, and the results will be good.
I’ve been asking Prime Minister Viktor Orbán questions on subjects including Voks2025, the EU ban on Russian energy and economic issues.
